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PREVENTIVE LAW BY CORPORATE
PROFESSIONAL TEAM PLAYERS:




Professionals increasingly work in corporations, where they are sub-
ject to the decisions of company managers and to legal imperatives
stemming from their status as corporate employees. Ironically, as their
numbers have grown, their autonomy has diminished. This trend is par-
ticularly stark in the case of company physicians, who share neither the
independence nor the high status of the solo practitioner.' Many proc-
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research support.
1. See generally ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY,
PROPHECY, AND POLICY (1994); FREDERIC W. HAFFERTY & JOHN B. MCKINLAY, THE
CHANGING MEDICAL PROFESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1993);
RAPHAEL SASSOWER, KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT EXPERTISE: ON THE STATUS OF
SCIENTISTS (1993); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND
PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA (1995). A few studies have considered
the work of physicians in large organizations. Investigators have paid some attention
to physicians on the staffs of large hospitals and health maintenance organizations
rather than manufacturing companies. See generally, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION
AND THE MAKING'OF A VAST INDUSTRY (1982); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL
POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986).
See also Mark G. Field, Structured Strain and the Soviet Physician, in MEDICAL
CARE: READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS (W. Richard Scott &
Edmund H. Volkart eds., 1966) (examining the work of Soviet physicians); MARK G.
FIELD, DOCTOR AND PATIENT IN SOVIET RUSSIA (1957); ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE
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esses that transform corporate professional work generally - such as
corporate restructuring, the ascendance of legal departments, changing
labor-management relations, and management by nonprofessionals -
profoundly affect company physicians. The activities of non-physician
managers, who are increasingly attuned to the legal and financial dimen-
sions of physicians' decisions, frequently diminish physicians' discre-
tion in diagnosis and treatment, employee testing, and information con-
veyed to employees. The formal corporate structure, legal pressures, and
informal cultural dimensions of work lead company doctors to help
serve -managerial goals by managing disability cases, responding to
regulation and the threat of lawsuits, burnishing employers' public im-
age, and setting corporate policy regarding employment and chemical
hazards. Company doctors are found disproportionately in large manu-
facturing and service corporations, where they make important decisions
about health hazards in society, as is clear, for example, from their role
in Manville Corporation and firms that have used large amounts of as-
bestos. 2 Their work is intrinsically conflicted, particularly in profit-
oriented corporations that are not in the business of providing profes-
sional services.
Physicians are the prototypical professional case, owing to their tradi-
tional independence, extensive training, power, and high status. But in
fact, professionals typically have not been so "independent." Social
workers, nurses, and professors have always worked as salaried employ-
ees, often for large corporations; engineers have traditionally been em-
ployed in corporations, where they have encountered dilemmas in aero-
space and the nuclear industry. Professionals ascend or decline over
time and in relation to other groups under specific conditions of em-
NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1986)
(analyzing Nazi doctors); Vivienne Walters, Company Doctors: Standards of Care
and Legitimacy: A Case Study from Canada, 19 SOC. SC. & MED. 811 (1984) (ana-
lyzing Canadian occupational physicians); DIANA CHAPMAN WALSH, CORPORATE
PHYSICIANS: BETWEEN MEDICINE AND MANAGEMENT (1987) (examining physicians
who manage corporate medical departments). Yet the number of studies that attend to
conditions of corporate employment remains small.
2. Company doctors are physicians who receive salaries from corporations to
provide medical services to employees. For a discussion of physicians in Manville
Corporation and firms that have used large amounts of asbestos, see generally
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985).
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ployment, professional socialization, and organizational pressures.3
However, the fact that employment is salaried does not itself say much
about prestige and power. Even many of those who have been self-
employed have been autonomous only in a trivial sense, since they have
depended on powerful, wealthy clients in limited markets.4 Self-
employment does not necessarily signify real autonomy, success, or
power.
Over the past several decades, the law has dramatically altered the
relationship of professionals to colleagues, clients, and the public. It
shapes professionals' judgment about what constitutes appropriate pro-
fessional conduct in many areas, including medical screening, employee
placement, chemical emissions, workers' compensation, medical mal-
practice, and responsibility for costs of disease. Professionals follow
news stories about litigation involving corporations and talk with others
in their workplace and profession about the meaning and significance of
court cases and statutory requirements. The ways in which they interpret
the meaning of the law have important effects on their decision making.
They cast social questions and moral quandaries as legal matters. The
prospect of a massive lawsuit or a jury trial with a multimillion dollar
award to the plaintiff often affects their work far more than one would
expect from the slight probability of such a suit.
Research on the rise of professionals has emphasized their autonomy,
specialized education, and privileged status. But early organizational
analysis and research on professions showed little concern with corpo-
rate employment. 5 Since the 1950s, however, more research has been
done on corporate professionals. Some of it is case study literature on
particular professional groups, such as engineers, lawyers, and scien-
tists. 6 Several major theories about professionals have addressed issues
3. On the history of professions, see generally ANDREW ABBOTr, THE SYSTEM
OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); Eliot Freid-
son, The Changing Nature of Professional Control, 10 ANN. REV. SOc. 1 (1984).
4. See generally STARR, supra note 1.
5. See generally, e.g, EVERETT C. HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR WORK (1958); W.
Richard Scott, Professionals in Bureaucracies: Areas of Conflict, in PROFESS-
IONALIZATION (Howard M. Vollmer & Donald L. Mills eds., 1966); Robert K. Mer-
ton, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, 18 SOC. FORCES 560 (1940); see also
generally FREIDSON, supra note I (discussing the rise of professionals).
6. For a discussion of scientists, see generally G. NIGEL GILBERT & MICHAEL
MULKAY, OPENING PANDORA'S Box: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTISTS'
DISCOURSE (1984); BARNEY G. GLASER, ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENTISTS: THEIR
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of professional norms and autonomy, casting them in terms of the extent
to which professionals have the power and ability to direct their own
work.7 These theories have produced bold assertions about profession-
PROFESSIONAL CAREERS (1964); WILLIAM KORNHAUSER, SCIENTISTS IN INDUSTRY:
CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION (1962); SIMON MARCSON, THE SCIENTIST IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY: SOME ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS N MANPOWER
UTILIZATION (1960); SASSOWER, supra note 1. For a discussion of lawyers, see gen-
erally RICHARD L. ABEL ed., LAWYERS: A CRITICAL READER (1997); JOHN R. HEINZ
& EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
(rev. ed. 1994); EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT
WORK (1986); Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, The Fate of Elite Idealism: Ac-
commodation and Ideological Work at Harvard Law School, 39 SOC. PROBS. 315
(1992); Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large
Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985). For a discussion of engineers, see
generally R. RICHARD RITrI, THE ENGINEER IN THE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
(1971); PETER WHALLEY, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF TECHNICAL WORK (1986);
ROBERT ZUSSMAN, MECHANICS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: WORK AND POLITICS
AMONG AMERICAN ENGINEERS (1985); George A. Miller, Professionals in Bureau-
cracy: Alienation Among Industrial Scientists and Engineers, 32 AM. SOc. REV. 755
(1967).
7. The bulk of literature on professionals is concerned with whether profession-
als are a powerful new class or whether professionals are becoming proletarianized or
deprofessionalized. One set of analysts argues for the growing strength of profession-
als relative to other workers and corporate managers. Bell's "postindustrial" theory
maintains that salaried professionals, rather than becoming subordinate to their new
employers, manage to gain control in their employing institutions and wield consider-
able influence within them. Moreover, professionals in the new postindustrial order
wrest power from the previously dominant group: those who control capital. The
growing influence of professionals stems from their valuable specialized knowledge.
See generally DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973).
Other related theorists, too, argue that professionals have ascended in relation to in-
dustrial capitalists. These include Galbraith, who portrays professionals as part of the
powerful technocracy. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). Steinfels sees growing social control by a "new class" of
professionals. See generally PETER STEINFELS, THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES (1979).
Freidson argues that although professionals have undergone increased bureaucratiza-
tion of their work, they have not experienced "deskilling" similar to nineteenth-
century industrial workers, instead often retaining high levels of both skill and auton-
omy. See generally ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE (1970). In contrast to these theories of professional
ascendance, theories of professional decline emphasize the shift from professional
self-employment to salaried employment and the resulting similarities between profes-
sionals and other workers as power and control over work is transferred from profes-
sionals to employers. Theorists of professional decline and "proletarianization" in-
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als' gaining or losing autonomy and control over their work, but usually
without considering the ways in which corporate structures, internalized
professional socialization, informal cultural dimensions of work, and the
law have transformed professional work.
In the mid-1950s, William H. Whyte's The Organization Man ana-
lyzed the changing values and work that accompanied expanding bu-
reaucratization, and C. Wright Mills's White Collar examined changing
orientations to work among middle-level corporate employees. 8 "The
organization man" was an apt description of corporate professional em-
ployment for its time, but times have changed. Although professionals
are still expected to do what their organization demands, they also read
professional journals, belong to professional organizations, and have
certain professional standards and concerns. The legal and political en-
vironment shapes their work. Moreover, they no longer expect lifetime
employment in exchange for loyal service to a corporation. For the
1990s, "the company doctor" is a more appropriate metaphor for under-
standing professional and managerial work in large corporations, for it
suggests the conflicting demands that corporate professionals experience
in the globalizing corporate economy.
This Article examines the growing influence of the law on corporate
professionals and ways in which their interpretation of the law affects
their behavior. It then analyzes doctors' perceptions of vulnerability to
lawsuits and the significance of legal risk. While professionals in large
corporations usually focus on how to comply with government regula-
clude Larson, who shows the tendency of professionals to be increasingly subject to
the constraints of corporate- or state-dominated markets. See generally MAGALI
SARFATHI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1977); Magali Sarfatti Larson, Proletarianization and Educated Labor, 9 THEORY &
Soc'Y 131 (1980). Derber and coauthors argue that a new system of labor process
control - "ideological proletarianization" - shifts power from professionals to man-
agers. See generally CHARLES DERBER ET AL., POWER IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE:
PROFESSIONALS AND THE RISE OF A NEW MANDARIN ORDER (1990). Oppenheimer
explains processes of rationalization and routinization that professionals experience in
bureaucratic organizations. See generally Martin Oppenheimer, White Collar Revis-
ited: The Making of a New Working Class, SOC. POL., July/Aug. 1970, at 27; Martin
Oppenheimer, The Proletarianization of the Professional, SOC. REV. MONOGRAPHS,
Dec. 1973, at 213.
8. See generally WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956);
C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1956); see
also generally REINHARD BENDIX, WORK AND AUTHORITY IN INDUSTRY: IDEOLOGIES
OF MANAGEMENT IN THE COURSE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION (1956).
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tion and avoid corporate liability for hazards, they also know they could
be sued individually for failing to protect employees and the public.
This perceived threat of individual legal accountability not only influ-
ences professionals' conduct, but also reinforces professional standards
in corporations. An analysis follows of lawyers' ambivalence about pro-
viding information to employees and the public, along with the ways in
which they cooperate and clash with doctors over making information
available. Next, this Article explores company physicians' approaches
toward preventive health. Company doctors focus less on preventive
health than on preventive law - especially practices designed to avoid
company liability and reduce costs of compliance with government
regulation. Finally, this Article considers some implications of this re-
search for policy and for an understanding of corporate professional
work in its legal and social context.
This study reveals powerful contradictory legal pressures on corporate
professionals. Doctors point to the adverse .effects of the legalization of
their field, with attorneys and the law increasingly directing their work.
However, litigation and regulation also have positive effects in requiring
risk reduction, compensating individuals for harm, and providing incen-
tives for corporate management to curtail hazards. In fact, the legal
structure has been both beneficial and harmful for occupational medi-
cine. Lawsuits are good to a point, beyond which they waste money on
litigation that could be better spent on health programs. Moreover, it is
not the legal requirements themselves that constrict corporate profes-
sionals most; rather, it is the ways in which corporate management has
chosen to respond to legal and economic pressures that most constrain
corporate professionals.
For the analysis of the social and legal dimensions of corporate pro-
fessional work, this Article draws on interviews with 100 company phy-
sicians, scientists, and government and labor officials across the U.S.,
case law and statutes, and trade association data and field research. Al-
though the words of corporate professionals infrequently appear in the
scholarly literature, here interviews and field research are valuable for
illuminating the social context of corporate professional work, including
the significance of the legal and social environment from the perspec-
tives of the social actors themselves.9 Such an analysis adds perspective
to doctrinal analysis of the law by shedding light on the organizational
9. The Article refers to confidential interviews with informants who requested
anonymity. See infra, Appendix.
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and cultural context in which the laws have effect.' 0
I. EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON CONCEPTIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR
Laws relating to professional work have changed radically over the
past forty years, notably in such areas as physicians' standard of care
and workers' assumption of risk." The threat of lawsuits against compa-
nies and the growth of legal departments within corporations have had
major effects on the work physicians do. Physicians are sensitive to the
legal implications of medicine and the role of lawyers in complicating
medical practice, at times to the detriment of employees' health.
Lawyers have risen in the corporate structure, and work in bigger and
more heavily funded corporate legal departments. Lawyers have a major
corporate role in interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),12 standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA), 13 and hiring and firing regulations. They help implement
new statutes and internal personnel policies. Many company lawyers
clarify state and federal statutes in different jurisdictions, and handle
medical-record information requests, grievances over benefits, and
workers' compensation claims. They advise doctors on how to structure
programs, and review contracts and benefit plans. They also become
involved in lawsuits after individuals are injured or die. Corporate legal
departments tend to subcontract litigation and all extraordinary events to
outside attorneys and firms, leaving the internal staff to deal with rou-
tine legal matters.
Physicians in large corporations have extensive contact with lawyers
who call them about pending suits or about what doctors should do in
their practice. In-house counsel asks physicians to review specific cases
and evaluate whether claimants have a case or not. Corporate attorneys
advise doctors on how to testify and interact with the media or opposing
attorneys in depositions. Some companies instruct physicians not to re-
spond when outside lawyers contact them, advising them that all re-
sponses must come from the legal office. Lawyers argue that certain
10. See id (discussing the study data and methods used in this Article).
11. See generally RAND E. ROSENBLATr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1997).
12. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
13. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1001-.1101 (1998).
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information should be provided, and certain tests be conducted, in order
to avoid company liability. In many cases - as when it issues directives
regarding handling records or diagnosing certain illnesses - a legal
department will set policy for the medical department. In other cases, it
will persuade, as when it tries to convince the medical department to
provide information in ways that may reduce future employee claims.
Both the attorney and the doctor work for the company to protect the
company's interests. When asked about potential areas of conflict with
the legal department, many company doctors said there really is no con-
flict because they run things past the legal department and do what the
lawyers tell them to do. One long-time company physician said he did
not need to run things by the legal department as much anymore; he al-
ready knew what they would say and therefore could do exactly what he
expected they would tell him to do. Company doctors who testify on the
company's behalf sometimes give the sense that the lawyer is standing
next to them as they do their job. Rather than clash with lawyers, physi-
cians sometimes incorporate the legal defense into their work, experi-
encing little sense of conflict. One doctor employed by a major con-
sumer products corporation described the closely affiliated goals of
company physicians and lawyers and said that when lawyers advise phy-
sicians, their major concerns are "avoiding lawsuits, hefty fines for non-
compliance, and bad publicity." He said:
We work closely with company lawyers trying to anticipate what
will be an issue rather than wait for somebody to file a suit.
We're all singing from the same hymnal; and that's what I like
to do. We can call up legal and say, "Look, I have a concern that
this will pop up, and can you help me dress-rehearse this and
prepare our case in advance." Crisis management takes an inor-
dinate amount of time once something has happened. You're
much better off if you can prevent it and reach an accommoda-
tion with the other person, so that's why we choose to call legal.
A chemical company physician said:
There's mutual respect between medical and legal. I assist attor-
neys in the company in medical-record review, toxic tort cases,
and workers' comp review. I give them straight medical infor-
mation. They ought to know their case will not fly, and the
sooner they learn, the better, even though they may not want to
hear it. We also have a few Superfund hazardous waste sites
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they are responsible for, and I've reviewed health risks for them
on materials that might be at the site. They review medical pub-
lications that emanate from our department. We publish a health
and environmental guide on a product and the lawyers look at it
to make sure we won't say something that means someone will
sue them later.
Sometimes it is difficult to sort out how much time doctors spend on
legal issues because they deal with worker surveillance, placement ex-
ams, and regulatory matters - all of which have a strong legal compo-
nent. In fact, so many medical matters are becoming legal matters that it
is hard to think of an occupational health issue that does not have legal
ramifications. As a telecommunications company physician said:
Virtually every decision is subject to review in court, which
didn't used to be the case. Issues used to be decided pretty much
on a straightforward medical basis; today very few medical is-
sues are straightforward. Almost all of them have legal over-
tones.
Some physicians expressed that they have almost constant contact
with the legal department, which is many times bigger than their medi-
cal department. Physicians generally spend far more time on legal mat-
ters than they did decades ago. A corporate medical director of an oil
company, for example, said that he usually spends four hours a day on
medical issues with legal implications or actually meeting with lawyers,
whereas he used to spend about an hour a month. Physicians employed
by computer and telecommunications companies said:
I spend at least one to two hours a day consulting with lawyers
or reviewing briefs and other legal documents. This firm has 100
times as many lawyers as doctors.
The medical people in a corporation even ten years ago might
have spoken with a lawyer once a month on a very complex
case. Today, virtually every day every physician in the company
spends at least an hour and sometimes three or four hours with
attorneys, because almost anything that comes along has legal
ramifications.
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A national labor official said:
The major occupation of occupational physicians is being in-
volved in litigation, whether it is administrative or tort. They
spend more time and money litigating than treating or doing re-
search or anything else. It's multiple testing, writing testimony,
and keeping records for going to court. Most corporate physi-
cians I know are very uncomfortable with this.
The amount of legal involvement increases dramatically when envi-
ronmental and safety issues are made part of occupational medicine.
Physicians increasingly have been drawn into litigating environmental
health problems. In the asbestos industry, for example, many in-house
and consulting occupational physicians advise companies on setting up
procedures and exposure limits; and as the basic liability problem has
shifted from manufacturers - primarily Manville - to companies that
remove asbestos, they work with attorneys defending against suits. That
growing arena involves translating issues of toxicology and epidemio-
logy into terms that lawyers can use in defending lawsuits. An airline
physician complained that adversarial legal cases threaten to overwhelm
him:
The company has defined my role completely differently than I
thought it would be. I hardly ever get a chance to just treat peo-
ple who'll get better, which is what I used to like about occupa-
tional medicine. Now everything adversarial that involves the
medical department comes to my desk: workers' compensation,
contested cases, grievances, and lawsuits. Then I wind up deal-
ing almost always with adversarial cases, where somebody is
really angry no matter what I do. The administrative aspects and
the adversarial-political aspects are wearing thin, and I'm tired
of anger and criticism and lack of appreciation of the complexity
and difficulty of what we do.
Despite the frequent doctor-lawyer cooperation as fellow profession-
als and corporate employees, medical and legal priorities may often
clash. Physicians feel torn between what their own medical judgment
leads them to favor and what the lawyers want them to do. Many times
company doctors say they believe individuals should return to work but
lawyers see a liability. Some public-health-trained physicians resist
when lawyers call to say the doctor must provide employee files or de-
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scribe risks to workers in specific ways. The medical department some-
times has been able to prevail in conflicts with company lawyers, but
lawyers tend to be more aggressive in asserting how the company should
act in internal disputes. Lawyers tend to be given precedence over phy-
sicians when they take a stand that doctors oppose, as physicians from
oil and publishing companies explained:
Lawyers are viewed as saviors and protectors from threat; that's
a powerful position. Often they are perceived as the organization
responsible for professional expertise in a situation of threat or
attack, so that is a very powerful place to be.
The physician has to understand he's merely an adviser to the
company. The lawyer in charge of the case makes the legal deci-
sion how it should be handled and it's a management decision
which road they take. I never take it personally. It behooves the
physician not to get too emotionally involved.
Clearly the legal department's interpretation of observing regu-
lations and laws will carry the day when a company that must
observe those laws employs you. The legal counsel is essentially
present to keep the company from getting in trouble, so a com-
promise or concession must be sought if the legal department
feels a particular action or process that medical people want
would legally endanger the company.
A national health and safety labor official said:
Litigation and liability has become such a major part of the op-
eration of many companies that it indeed becomes a final word
or a final screen for everything, which is unfortunate.
A physician for a bank stated: "We don't have any conflict with the at-
torneys. They tend to be on our side." But this same physician displayed
on his office wall a framed quotation in calligraphy: "'The first thing we
do, let's kill all the lawyers.' William Shakespeare's Henry VI, Part II,
Act 4, Scene 2."
Doctors talk about how the fear of lawsuits against companies guides
medicine in a defensive direction and distorts the practice of medicine in'
corporations. As a major oil company physician said:
19991
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A corporation spends a lot of money unnecessarily on preventive
legal medical practice. Sometimes the lawyer doesn't want the
doctor to do something the doctor wants to do because it might
show something the lawyer doesn't want to show. Let's say a
former employee is suing the company for a bad back and the
doctor thinks another test would be good to make sure that he
doesn't have something else, and the lawyer asks the doctor,
"What if that test is abnormal; then what?"
Lawyers and medical malpractice carriers often seek to settle cases
with the least amount of loss even when physicians protest that they
have done nothing wrong. In certain situations, the company chooses not
to fight employee claims because doing so would cost more than settling
or would raise other issues that could harm the corporation, as this
chemical company physician explained:
I mainly have conflict with our law department on settling. It's
painful to me to settle and give away the store when I want to
dig in my heels and defend a case that the lawyers tell me is ex-
pensive and stupid to defend. But it's crazy to go through this
big ceremonial war to carry out my principles and still probably
lose in front of a jury even though we're right.
Many physicians in corporations say they dislike lawyers, objecting to
what lawyers want doctors to do and describing the tension between
them. Some physicians say lawyers tend to be trained in amorality -
not seeing problems in moral terms, in stark contrast to doctors' training
and orientation. A metals company physician said:
The corporate legal profession influences outcomes by shading
the truth. To be a successful lawyer, one characteristic you must
have or acquire is amorality. It's win-at-all-cost, which has
nothing to do with justice. The lawyer's foremost responsibility
is to the company, and it's fine if the employee happens to bene-
fit from that. The doctor will favor the employees even if their
needs conflict with the company. The inability to differentiate
right from wrong morally goes totally against the grain of a phy-
sician and his upbringing, training, and relationship with people.
Physicians with the best intentions in the world can be destroyed
by the way the legal system deals with them. Boy, I'm dead if
they hear this!: I dislike lawyers, and I blame them for a major-
ity of our social and medical ills. But if the other side called me
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as their witness, it would create a problem and our lawyers
would say, "That's conflict of interest and you can't do that."
I've never testified for the other side in my many years here.
This observation is both common and significant. Doctors may clash
with attorneys for the company, but in contested cases, the "other side"
usually consists of employees. Like this physician, doctors generally
cooperate with company attorneys in defending cases, whatever their
sentiment about the attorneys involved.
II. PERCEPTIONS OF VULNERABILITY TO SUITS
AGAINST DOCTORS
Physicians in private practice, whether or not they are in occupational
medicine, often complain that the high price of malpractice insurance
and the threat of lawsuits by patients places an unfair burden on their
practices. But in the case of company medicine, employees generally
have been unable to sue company physicians, in part because they have
been considered fellow servants or co-agents. 14 In addition, workers'
compensation is the traditional and exclusive remedy of workers who
get hurt; they generally cannot sue physicians who fail to diagnose dis-
eases or to inform them of risks before they are injured.
Doctors generally have their employers' backing when they are named
in a suit. Their companies answer the complaint and defend them. Be-
cause companies carry insurance for doctors and have the support of a
corporate legal department, physicians who work for them are less con-
cerned about lawsuits and malpractice insurance expenses than physi-
cians in private practice. As physicians from publishing, retail sales, and
oil companies said:
My friends say, "What happens if you get sued?" and my re-
sponse is, "If somebody wants to sue, fine, but that's what they
pay our lawyers for - to keep me and the other managers in this
company out of jail." I just refer outside lawyers to my lawyers
and let them hassle it out. They talk to our workers' comp peo-
ple on workers' comp cases, so I don't get caught with that.
They handle it lawyer-to-lawyer.
The company has a general liability policy. Every doctor knows
14. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 709-19 (1993).
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you can always be sued because you can't stop lawyers from
suing whomever they wish. It's just that doctors know the com-
pany will defend you - one hopes (laughs) - as long as you
aren't grossly negligent in performing your duties for the com-
pany.
This is a very big company with very deep pockets and a lot of
smart lawyers that work for them. They don't want to sue me
when they can sue the corporation. When they look at the com-
pany, there's no way they can see me. The company says they
will stand behind us if we use good judgment, so I don't think
about being sued very much, though we are constantly involved
with the legal system. We evaluate people in workers' comp
cases, and it could always flip from normal workers' comp into
something where the person gets a lawyer and sues the company
and sues me.
Many company doctors are further protected from patients' lawsuits
because they treat only minor injuries and illnesses. Much of what they
do consists of giving physical exams rather than delivering primary care
to people with serious diseases. They may diagnose health problems as
part of the medical monitoring that government regulation requires, but
they send people to private physicians for treatment rather than treat
employees themselves. Thus they do not bear the same risks as private
physicians. As a telecommunications company doctor said:
There have been employee complaints of malpractice by our
medical staff, but very few relative to the volume of clinical
services. What we do is relatively low risk anyway: mostly
evaluations and no surgery. Doctors in this corporate environ-
ment don't feel the great malpractice issue.
Whereas professionals forty years ago could expect the law and their
corporate employment to shield them from legal action, vulnerability to
lawsuits is growing within corporations. Physicians and other company
personnel have increasing liability for workplace hazards.' 5 Legislatures
and courts have created exceptions to the exclusive-remedy provision of
workers' compensation under most state law. They have allowed tort
actions against company physicians and employers in limited circum-
15. See id.; ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 869-904 (1998).
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stances, such as for intentional torts or suits against employers and their
doctors serving in a "dual capacity" as employer and provider of medi-
cal services, as well as third-party suits against manufacturers based on
negligence and product liability. 16 Company physicians have been sued
by citizens from the community in third-party suits and by employees
who have alleged that individual professionals intentionally put workers
at risk, withheld information, or failed to warn people.
Company physicians increasingly find themselves in what must seem
the worst of both worlds: they work in a corporate structure and need to
be team players, but they can still be individually sued and even made
criminally liable for their performance in a corporation. Many occupa-
tional physicians who seldom worried about liability in the past now
fear being held personally liable for corporate decisions to which they
only contributed. 7 Doctors become more attentive if they think they are
individually responsible, because employers may not necessarily stand
behind them or continue to cover their malpractice insurance if problems
arise. As a physician with a manufacturing corporation said:
16. Most states permit employers' intentional torts to fall outside the workers'
compensation system's coverage through statutes and case law. Standards for satis-
fying the intentional tort exception vary among the states. See 2 LASoN's WORKERS'
CoMPENsATIoN § 68.13 at 13-3 to 13-11 (Desk ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993). See, e.g.,
Millison v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1985). In Millison,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found for the employee plaintiff in a tort action con-
cerning workplace asbestos hazards. See id. at 518. The company physician had
fraudulently concealed important health information and thereby contributed to em-
ployees' aggravated disease by failing to warn of the evidence of disease and further
risks the employees faced. See id. at 516. The court stated that fraud is not within the
ordinary risks of employment. See id. The court held that the New Jersey Workers'
Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision does not bar plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion for aggravation of the diseases resulting from defendants' fraudulent concealment
of already-discovered disabilities. See id. at 518; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West
1998). The court also held that the employees were limited to workers' compensation
benefits for any initial occupational disease disabilities related to hazards of their em-
ployment. See Millison, 501 A.2d at 514.
17. Physicians worry about being held personally liable for their decisions in
corporations even though their chance of such a suit is small. Professionals in large
companies with occupational health programs are particularly concerned because
they generally know more about potential liability than managers in smaller com-
panies, with minimal or no legal teams to advise them; moreover, plaintiffs' law-
yers consider their employers to be especially attractive as defendants in lawsuits
because the awards are likely to be larger from major corporations.
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You can be sued in a corporation and it can cost the corporation
millions, though the corporation generally covers and insures
you. But a physician in a corporation could be sued and even
end up in jail for serious malpractice of occupational medicine,
such as a misdiagnosis of asbestosis during medical surveillance
or another medical mistake that would require gross negligence.
These things happen where physicians found something and
didn't inform the patient. The condition progressed and led to
more problems. Not informing was the mistake.
A factor that intensifies doctors' concern is their belief that a manager
or company professional such as a doctor is more likely to be sent to jail
than a CEO. As a physician with a major computer company said:
Most of the time employers respond to hazards because they
genuinely care or they're afraid of lawsuits. With criminal law-
suits in the last few years, a lot of employers have had their an-
tennae out. When managers hear they are individually responsi-
ble for hazards, their ears perk up, like my dog. That's what the
law says. After all, it's not the CEO who will go to jail; it's you,
the manager. A CEO might go to jail, depending on the corpora-
tion and how big the issue is and what the evidence shows. But
the immediate management is much more likely to take it in the
neck, and they won't be able to duck. The Eichmann defense, "I
was following orders," doesn't work well anymore. People are
much more aware of this today than they were just a few years
ago. And they should be! It's real! Someone will catch it one of
these days.
Physicians also fear that management may deliberately leave judgment
calls to physicians, in the belief that physicians rather than the employer
may be liable if their decision turns out badly.
Prosecutors have pursued companies with criminal charges on behalf
of communities, as they did with the Bhopal disaster in India.' 8 Profes-
sionals perceive a growing threat of criminal charges against individual
18. See WILLBORN ET AL., -supra note 14, at 985-97; Michael B. Bixby, Was It an
Accident or Murder? New Thrusts in Corporate Criminal Liability for Workplace
Deaths, 41 LAB. L.J. 417 (1990); Steven Ferrey, Hard Time: Criminal Prosecution
for Polluters, AMICUS J., Fall 1988, at 11. For a description of the events surrounding
the Bhopal disaster, see generally DAN KURZMAN, A KILLING WIND: INSIDE UNION
CARBIDE AND THE BHOPAL CATASTROPHE (1987).
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executives; in the Chicago Magnet Wire case,' 9 five corporate officers
were charged with aggravated battery and reckless conduct for causing
injury to forty-two employees by failing to provide necessary safety
precautions. 20 A telecommunications company physician later said:
The Chicago Magnet Wire case was a totally different kettle of
fish because it was intentional. The company was liable, but
those company officers were, in fact, the same as the company
when it came to criminal liability. You can't commit murder and
say, "The company made me do it."
Physicians may succeed, however, by saying, "The company made me
do it. I was afraid of losing my job, and this was a company policy."
Prosecutors have focused on finding out who set the policy. In a crimi-
nal case, if it is the company president, then the company president
would ordinarily be held liable. But in civil cases, physicians are more
likely to be held liable.2'
Corporate professionals fear jury trials, in which the standard of care
- what a reasonable person should have known - is determined in the
courtroom. Doctors will serve as expert witnesses and medical associa-
19. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (I11. 1989).
20. See id. at 963. The court held that OSHA does not preempt the State of Illi-
nois from prosecuting the corporation and five of its officers for conduct that OSHA
standards regulate, despite the approval of OSHA officials. See id at 965-66.
21. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 15, at 869-904; WILLBORN ET AL., supra note
14, at 985-97; Bixby, supra note 18,' at 423; see also United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals held
that any corporate officer or employee who personally participates in conduct that
violates the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996), or contributes to a
substantial endangerment to the environment in violation of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. II
1996), may be held individually liable for that violation. See id. at 745-46. The court
held that a corporate vice president for the Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Company (Nepacco) was strictly liable for arranging for the disposal of hazardous
substances under CERCLA § 107(a)(3) and that the company president was individu-
ally liable for contributing to an imminent and substantial endangerment to health and
the environment in violation of RCRA. See id A plant supervisor for Nepacco had
dumped drums of toxic chemicals into a trench on a farm near the plant, with the per-
mission of the vice president. See id at 730. The court rejected the defendant vice
president's argument that he acted on behalf of the corporation and could not be held
individually liable without piercing the corporate veil. See id at 744.
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tions will be consulted when juries and judges later identify the appro-
priate standard of care or interpret statutes. Corporate executives, pro-
fessionals, and lawyers worry about shifting community standards for
what a reasonably prudent doctor would do. The public may increas-
ingly believe that corporate professionals are individually responsible
for decisions in their corporations, and public opinion influences the
outcome of jury trials, with potentially massive awards. Some physi-
cians say they try to imagine what a jury might think in five or even
twenty years, anticipating the future standard by which they might be
judged.
Environmental groups and individuals outside the corporation may
sue company physicians for environmental hazards. One oil company
physician was named in a citizens' lawsuit over the public health effects
of chemical emissions from his company's refinery fumes drifting into
the community. He said:
I have been sued personally for, quote, "environmental crimes"
of the company against the community in a "clinical ecology"
lawsuit. That's the latest vehicle for suits brought against us per-
sonally. Our outside lawyers advise me how to testify. The
plaintiff typically sues the company, but an increasing trend for
regulatory suits and outside plaintiffs is to name responsible in-
dividuals in the company. People seem to want to accept that
any chemical exposure, no matter how minor, can cause serious
illness. You never know what a jury will believe and these
things drag on a long time, so it's distressing.
Furthermore, physicians who want to be perceived as team players are
loathe to be associated with trouble and sued from outside the corpora-
tion. This can lead them to practice "defensive medicine." A major oil
company physician described:
Health and medical issues are increasingly high-liability prob-
lems. When one is responsible for a large administrative net-
work, as I am, the courts assume that you knew, or should have
known, what was going on. But that's not always possible. How
do you find out about all the health and environmental practices
in a vast organization, with complex administration? You can't,
but you're held responsible.' It certainly makes our medical
practices more defensive. It goes beyond being careful and thor-
ough.
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Some lawsuits have been filed for breaches of medical confidentiality,
in cases where physicians gave management data that employees con-
sidered private, or withheld important medical information. 22 A national
steelworkers union official said:
An airline company doctor who did fitness-for-work exams dis-
covered a pilot had cancer but never told him. It took several
months for this to be detected. The pilot sued him, and the jury
found no doctor-patient relationship. In cases where we have to
go after a company doctor to stop, a questionable practice, we
tell the doctor, "Look, you may think no doctor-patient relation-
ship exists here, but that's for a jury to decide if it comes to that;
and I'm happy to oblige if you want to take your chances with
that kind of trial."
Statutes under which individual doctors may be held liable are becoming
more common. For example, the California Labor Code specifies a
criminal penalty for company retaliation against employees who pursue
their rights under workers' compensation.23 A major computer company
physician said:
One of these days a California case on that [California Labor
Code] Section 132a statute will send a bigger tremor through the
state than the Loma Prieta earthquake.
The California Corporate Criminal Liability Act is sometimes nick-
named the "be a manager, go to jail" act. This Act provides for signifi-
cant fines (up to one million dollars for a corporation) and even the im-
prisonment of managers found to be out of compliance with the law. It
criminalizes the conduct of managers who know of a serious concealed
danger associated with a business practice or product but who know-
ingly fail to notify the state occupational health agency and affected
employees within fifteen days, or immediately if an imminent risk of
great bodily harm or death exists. Under the Act, managers "have
knowledge" if they possess facts that would lead a reasonable person to
believe a danger exists.24 A government official familiar with compa-
22. See generally, e.g., Millison v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505
(N.J. 1985).
23. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a(1), (3) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 387 (West Supp. 1999).
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nies' occupational health programs and the statute said:
The Corporate Criminal Liability Act was passed at the same
time as the new Injury and Illness Prevention Program regula-
tions, so everybody thinks Cal-OSHA will put you in jail if you
don't have an Injury and Illness Prevention Program. It's a big
mess, but at the same time it's another incentive for behavior.
It's more than a regulatory incentive - it's a criminal incentive.
Criminal penalties also apply under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act25 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).26 Corporations
must designate certain corporate officials who are individually responsi-
ble for TSCA-related decisions and could be held criminally liable and
go to jail if the company does not report. 27 A services company physi-
cian said:
In every corporation you have to say who the person responsible
for this [TSCA] area is, and it can't be some low-lying official
like a second lieutenant; it has to be like a general, and that per-
son must have that responsibility. The first time I went to the
company fifteen years ago and met the medical director's boss,
the first thing he said was, "Yes, I'm the guy who goes to jail if
you violate the law, and I don't want to go to jail." The fact that
you tell a corporation to designate ahead of time who goes to jail
if you violate the law makes the designated person a lot more
cognizant about what's going on.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 28 supports professional
25. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1994 & Supp. II
1996). This law states that any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or
order'promulgated pursuant to the OSHA Act § 6 (or any regulations prescribed pur-
suant to the OSHA Act), if that violation caused death to any employee, shall be im-
prisoned for not more than six months or be fined - raised to $500,000 for an organi-
zation and $250,000 for an individual after passage of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act in 1984 (or both a fine and imprisonment). See id; see also CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 8, §§ 10406, 10447 (discussing, in order, (1) pleadings, and (2) pre-
application proceedings).
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
27. See id. § 2615. For a conviction of knowingly or willfully violating the
TSCA, the statute calls for a fine of not more than $25,000 for each day of the vio-
lation, or imprisonment for one year, or both. See id.
28. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
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standards and professional judgment by increasing the scrutiny of doc-
tors' decisions regarding who is fit for employment. Before the ADA, a
physician's decision about an individual's employability or capacity to
do a specific job was a professional opinion; the employer could accept
it, seek another physician's opinion, or do something else. Now, under
the ADA, any employer who places an employee, or does not place an
applicant for employment for a health reason, must be able to defend
that decision in a court of law. Employees can sue employers whose
physicians say they are not fit to work at a particular job. Further, com-
panies can be forced to pay punitive and compensatory damages of up to
$300,000 for each count of unlawful, intentional discrimination. 29 Insur-
ance for that kind of liability then becomes more expensive or more dif-
ficult to obtain.
Physicians trained in occupational medicine are less vulnerable to
litigation because they generally know more about what to look for in
evaluating an individual's abilities. Companies that realize this are more
likely to solicit advice from trained occupational physicians. However,
physicians with minimal training in occupational medicine still deliver
most medical services to employees. To contain costs, these services are
increasingly provided by contract physicians who are technically not co-
employees and therefore are liable to suit without that corporate protec-
tion. Some of these private physicians are now refusing to conduct ex-
ams for companies because they want to avoid subjecting themselves to
this kind of liability. A physician with a major oil corporation said:
How long will the local doctor call himself the corporate medi-
cal director now with the ADA? He won't like that title the min-
ute a lawyer slaps a lawsuit on him, or the minute a company
questions him and says we might have trouble with this decision.
Some corporations buy an insurance umbrella that covers not only the
full-time but also the part-time physicians and outside consultants who
act on behalf of the corporation. More often, corporations pay only in-
29. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (1994) (allowing for the re-
covery of punitive and compensatory damages); see also id. § 1981A(b)(3) (setting a
cap on compensatory and punitive damages). Under the statute, damages are capped
depending on the number of persons employed by a company. For example, for a
company employing 500 or more individuals, damages are capped at $300,000; for a
company employing only 15 to 100 individuals, damages are capped at $50,000. See
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house physicians' malpractice insurance costs.
The perceived threat of individual legal accountability strengthens
physicians' leverage with management. Doctors can point out that man-
agement could be liable if it could be shown that they knew about a
problem and did nothing to solve it, or that they disclosed confidential
information. A major oil company physician explained how he has
talked to corporate managers:
I tell them "I have a specific job to protect this part of the com-
pany that's been given to me. I am told to do things that are
medically appropriate and to keep the information confidential.
If you don't like that, then you have to take it up with the person
who set the system up this way. The company gives me this
piece of the job to do, and you'll get into a lot of trouble if I
don't do my job." I tell them, "If I release this confidential rec-
ord to you and someone complains, then I'll go to jail and you'll
go to jail too and so will your boss. So if you don't want your
boss to go to jail, just listen to what I say and you won't keep
asking for records because I won't give them to you."
The impact of the law on physicians' decisions can be quite different
from what one might expect, even when "the law" is codified, court de-
cisions seem clear, and legislation appears straightforward. A narrow
and local but well-publicized legal decision may spread fear through
entire industries. For example, in Chicago Magnet Wire,30 where corpo-
rate officials were personally charged with the poisoning of workers, the
court ruling in fact had limited scope, but the case cast an ominous
shadow over corporate practices, resulting in new corporate policies.
3 1
Conversely, OSHA regulations requiring that lung function tests be per-
formed or records be kept on the workdays lost due to occupational dis-
ease may have little actual effect unless vigorous government enforce-
ment makes corporate employees believe the regulations are important.
30. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (III. 1989).
31. See id. at 963. Similarly, early rulings on possible corporate liability for fetal
damage due to employee exposure to dioxin and lead have been circumscribed but
nevertheless have had a definite, broad impact, leading to extensive corporate policies
of excluding fertile women from jobs with exposure to toxic chemicals. See generally,
e.g., Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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III. THREATS OF LITIGATION AND REGULATION
OF HEALTH HAZARDS
Conservative analysts bemoan litigiousness in our society, tracing
social ills to greedy claimants, zealous lawmakers, and rapacious law-
yers. 2 They argue that these pressures have drained corporate vitality
and skewed corporate work away from its proper goals. Corporations
and insurance companies have paid many millions of dollars in occupa-
tional and environmental health claims over the past twenty years. The
business press also condemns what it describes as an epidemic of tort
litigation. Similarly, physicians of all kinds complain that too much time
and money is spent on lawyers and others who find fault with the con-
duct of employers and doctors, as did these airline and computer com-
pany physicians:
Employees often sue the company for job stress if there's an air-
craft accident or an occupational injury, or even a non-
occupational injury that affects fitness for work. If they sprained
an ankle slipping on the water in the kitchen, they come over
here, get treated, and the next thing I know they have a lawyer
for a seemingly minor problem, especially if they think that they
might get terminated for some other reason, like a language or
cultural barrier.
Everything in the law is somebody's fault: It's somebody's fault
if I get sick or if I work with asbestos and get lung cancer. But if
you smoke cigarettes and work with asbestos, you may be ten
times more at risk for lung.cancer. A technological society has
risks of illness that it continues to be willing to have, by default
or by informed decision. All of us deal with what's acceptable
risk every day. The law has not necessarily caught up with that.
A physician with a major bank complained about a huge monetary
32. For discussion of social effects of litigation, see generally Marc Galanter, The
Transnational Traffic in Legal Remedies, in LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK
MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994); PETER W. HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1990). On the over-
estimation of litigiousness, see generally Michael Saks, The Behavior of the Tort Liti-
gation System, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
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award to an employee with lung cancer after a jury found that another
physician in the company had failed to diagnose the man's condition
adequately when he came to the medical department complaining of
chest pain. He stated:
The court awarded him seven million dollars. They accused us
of not doing an adequate exam. The court was unreasonable, but
there was nothing we could do. The man should feel lucky he's
still alive.
Despite doctors' complaints, government regulation and - even more
- the threat of litigation have created powerful pressures on employers
to reduce health hazards.
A. Government Regulation
Occupational health changed because of the OSHA Act, along with
the ensuing regulations and litigation. Thirty years ago, before OSHA,
the occupational medicine field was smaller and much less active. Peti-
tions and lawsuits that public interest groups brought gave rise to OSHA
health standards. Legislators who responded to the pressures of the time
also changed the widespread perceptions of occupational and environ-
mental problems. In some cases lawyers were the driving force.33 The
effects of OSHA are an example of laws empowering professionals to do
what they want to do. A physician who worked in a large metals com-
pany said:
Those of us who were laboring in the vineyard welcomed
OSHA, because it brought recognition to the importance of what
we were doing. Some said the OSHA acronym meant "Our
Savior Has Arrived." Things have improved immeasurably in
the last forty years that I've been involved in occupational medi-
cine. Even though the OSHA program is pilloried and has had
difficulties, it has been a major influence in improving work-
place health protection and the recognition of hazards. Now
there's no place to hide from hazards in company operations.
The awareness is way up with the right-to-know OSHA rules
33. Fora discussion of the history of OSHA and the role attorneys had in its de-
velopment, see generally NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE:
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY (1976); DAVID P. MCCAFFREY, OSHA AND THE
POLITICS OF HEALTH REGULATION (1982).
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and the understanding that working people now get, especially
through their unions. With the right to know, people insist on
knowing what the hazards are.
A national labor official with the steelworkers' union said:
Companies had certain responsibilities after OSHA came along,
and to that degree, their safety and health people came out from
underneath the bushel. Employers had to listen to them.
Many companies developed a more lax approach to compliance as
deregulation in many ways succeeded and OSHA enforcement declined
in the 1980s. The incentive for employers to pay attention to health is-
sues lessens when regulatory agencies like OSHA generally reduce their
regulatory activity. The need for doctors or hygienists or safety engi-
neers declines along with it.34 When they experience pressures to
downsize, some companies replace medical departments with contract-
ing services. An aerospace company physician said:
OSHA enforcement certainly isn't the hot button that it was back
when OSHA first came into place. Some companies that in des-
peration went out and hired staff now feel more comfortable
with what the problems are and how to control them.
Because the cost of inspecting many small companies is great, en-
forcement of occupational health and environmental laws is less of a
threat to them and they have fewer incentives to invest in safety meas-
ures. A newspaper company physician said:
In some cases legislation was good because companies weren't
investing in engineering controls without OSHA and EPA.
Somebody had to tell them to do it. Regulators spend more time
with big companies, but ninety-five percent of the people work
for small companies, where regulators don't even go unless they
get a complaint. Small companies have consultants who proba-
bly never visit their premises, or they may not even contract out
34. A factor that in some cases compensates for cutbacks in the number of en-
forcement officers is that civil penalties in federal OSHA and some states (such as
Cal-OSHA) have increased. These more significant frnes make some employers more
attentive to the threat of enforcement, even though their chance of being inspected
remains small.
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at all. They hope the regulators won't fine them for their prac-
tices, and the employees don't get protected.
OSHA requires regular medical testing of employees who are exposed
to one of about twenty chemicals or who are involved in emergency re-
sponse, but company physicians do not always conduct those tests. Al-
though corporations are supposed to have doctors on staff or on contract,
many do not. OSHA enforcement varies between regional offices, but in
general not enough people and resources are available for inspections
and inspectors often examine only a small part of a given workplace. A
high-level OSHA official said:
OSHA has moved very slowly with health standards over the
years. We've never bounded forward in occupational medicine.
The agency has had to go the long way around in setting stan-
dards in the first place. It's a slow and painful process. Never-
theless, we've done a great deal by osmosis, because we have a
general duty clause, which states that the employer must provide
a safe workplace; and companies who appreciate the need to run
a safe and healthful workplace are aware of OSHA and the need
to employ appropriate qualified physicians. The word has gotten
around that OSHA's likely to come in and fine you if you don't
do the right thing, and fines have gone up dramatically: what
used to be a $7,000 fine can now be a $70,000 fine. Companies
have learned that they can be in big financial trouble if they
don't do what they are supposed to do. Still, the government's
general philosophy largely dictates whether companies think
they need the expense of physicians when the laws are so few
and far between and will be fewer in the future. Companies say
"Let's just have a contract doctor in an HMO who knows some-
thing about occupational medicine and use him when we need
his services. We don't need to employ somebody permanently."
Occupational medicine benefits from having the threat of OSHA in a
company's backyard. Many doctors have a positive view of OSHA, in
part because it helps give them their jobs and preserves their role. Occu-
pational medicine tends to expand when regulation expands." In the
textile industry, for example, the cotton dust standard required that
35. If OSHA were reformed to include generic medical surveillance and envi-
ronmental monitoring standards, for example, that would be an impetus for hiring
more doctors.
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companies maintain medical surveillance conducted by a doctor or an
industrial hygienist, and this increased the number of staff physicians
hired to deal with it. 36 Doctors in corporations recognize that new regu-
lations can help them promote corporate health programs. However,
doctors or unions cannot rely on the threat of regulation if it is toothless.
A national AFL-CIO official stated:
Requirements of the last decade have greatly expanded resources
in the environmental protection area, whereas programs and
people are dying in occupational health, with no impetus for
putting money or people into these programs. We hope OSHA
law and regulations will change to bring about the same kind of
developments in safety and health. If we pass the OSHA Reform
Bill and put in place a medical surveillance standard requiring
an overall comprehensive safety and health program, companies
will need somebody there in-house to figure out what the pro-
gram is and oversee it.
Despite the limitations of OSHA regulation, many employers give
greater attention to occupational health than they did twenty years
ago, because more OSHA rules now have testing requirements and
medical provisions requiring company compliance. Doctors who
once did only a few types of examinations now do many more,
partly in response to new regulations.
B. Effects of Litigation
Although lawsuits do not serve the same function as regulation, li-
ability is a deterrent to unsafe conditions. OSHA regulations require
employers to provide occupational health services to employees, and
therefore give company doctors a job in medical monitoring. Regulation
boosts company medicine in ways that lawsuits do not because compa-
nies are shielded almost completely from employee lawsuits for occupa-
tional disease, and because employers facing a third-party lawsuit can
always hire outside medical experts rather than use company doctors to
testify in litigation. A computer company physician said:
Companies do things that they have to do that aren't optional,
like regulations. You have to do asbestos or lead testing if you
work with asbestos or have lead levels that trigger OSHA re-
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1998).
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quirements. The same is true for people working with a host of
other hazardous chemicals. If it costs the company money,
that's too bad. It's a cost of doing business. People will regulate
their exposure if the government tells them to, or if they must do
it to avoid getting sued. A properly designed regulation is more
effective and costs less than the threat of lawsuits.
Nonetheless, the threat of litigation has had some of the same effects
as regulation. It often is effective, for example, in convincing companies
to curtail hazardous conditions. Cutbacks in government occupational
health rulemaking and enforcement in the 1980s and early 1990s re-
duced the incentive for companies to do medical monitoring and incur
preventive health expenses. In addition, workers' compensation gener-
ally has not forced employers to clean up hazards, aside from notorious.
cases like asbestos, even though preventing illness has been a stated
goal of the compensation system. Under these conditions, the threat of
third-party lawsuits, or lawsuits for intentional misconduct, now serves
some of the same functions as regulation did in determining what corpo-
rations will do to protect their interests. Litigation has restrained exces-
sive short-term profit-seeking at the expense of preventive health pro-
grams. The specter of another asbestos debacle and jury trials in which
companies can be held liable for health effects - with attendant adverse
public opinion - works as a deterrent. Fear of lawsuits has led corpora-
tions to put more money into health and safety than they otherwise
would have. As a doctor with a major computer company said:
We've been pro-active when we have a company product where
a large number of people might be exposed. We assess the lit-
erature and decide whether it's reasonable or not. We set up an
internal standard that's more stringent than OSHA, just because
we know OSHA will be a long time getting around to it, and we
know that we can be faulted down the line because following the
standards is not a defense. Most people in the company and the
attorneys certainly recognize that we have to do what we know
is right if we know the standard is not right.
A lawyer who specializes in company health hazards said:
Industry's standard for labeling is stricter than OSHA's, because
companies don't want to be sued.
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Lawsuits for damage from toxic chemicals can be large, multi-
million-dollar cases. A physician who has provided occupational health
services for many companies said:
Environmental and occupational medical litigation is a generally
positive force toward health and safety. The win rate against
companies is pretty high in occupational disease. Toxic tort can-
cer cases resulting from benzene and other substances can be
settled in the millions. Financial incentives are high. Those law-
yers know how to pick their cases. You don't see them giving up
occupational or environmental law because it's running out of
money.
Employers are concerned about heavy litigation costs and adverse
publicity from major chemical spills or disaster contamination of the
sort Union Carbide had in Bhopal. 37 Many third-party lawsuits have
been filed against equipment manufacturers whose machines have in-
jured workers. Such suits have made manufacturers more reluctant to
rush to market with products before considering their potentially harm-
ful health effects on workers. A physician who directs an occupational
medicine clinic and a manufacturing company physician said:
The toxic tort drives a lot of what goes into occupational and
environmental health today. Liability often drives the whole
thing. I'm not sure that's helped a lot, but it's been good to have
more demonstrations that you need to have careful corporate
health responsibility. Personal injury and toxic torts have been
extended and asbestos lawsuits have frightened people. The be-
lief that management can look past health issues and they will
just go away, just doesn't exist anymore. The threat of lawsuits
has led corporations to be more concerned about health in the
workplace than they were.
The medical department may cost something to the company,
but it is there to protect the employee. It's just like the Pinto that
blew up - look how much it eventually cost the company to cut
corners.
In-house medical services can save companies money from workers'
compensation awards or lawsuits, whereas cutting them back may add to
37. See generally KURZMAN, supra note 18.
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their expenses. Companies that once tried to save money by hiring com-
paratively untrained contract physicians have sometimes paid heavily
for misdiagnosed illnesses and other mistakes. On the other hand, hav-
ing a medical department within the company also creates fears of liti-
gation among managers, because any health facility will make mistakes.
Employers worry about the possibility of a malpractice settlement that
exceeds their insurance coverage limits and cuts into corporate profits.
A banking company physician and a physician who has provided occu-
pational health services to many companies said:
The legal element can have an inhibiting influence on occupa-
tional medicine. Given the litigiousness of individuals and soci-
ety in general, an adverse legal experience - even simply a nui-
sance suit - can easily discourage corporate management from
having an occupational-medicine entity on premises, especially
in a setting like this bank where it's not mandatory, as it is in a
chemical or oil company like Mobil or Exxon.
What little medical activity went on in companies started to de-
cline out of the legal fear of getting too close to health-care.
One way employers deal with this fear of suits stemming from their
in-house medical staff is by spreading the risk. For example, a corpora-
tion may ask occupational medical researchers from a university to join
projects and work on tests. The university then shares responsibility for
any legal problems that may occur.
The legal structure has been both beneficial and harmful for occupa-
tional medicine. Lawsuits are good up to a point, beyond which they
waste money that could go instead to health programs. Asbestos litiga-
tion, for example, was beneficial in uncovering hazards and company
misconduct in the early cases.38 As the litigation spread, it hastened the
drastic reduction in use of asbestos and other toxins. But then the role of
the lawyers began to change: less time was spent working methodically
to uncover hazards and more time processing claims and making money
without unearthing much new information.
Tort litigation has been unsuccessful in preventing the occurrence of
occupational disease in general. 39 It is strictly reactive, which is part of
38. See generally BRODEUR, supra note 2.
39. In addition, corporate concern with litigation can cause employers and
company physicians to avoid preventive measures. When companies are in the
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the dilemma in which physicians are caught. It sends a message - like a
ripple effect - to corporate officials: "You'd better watch out to avoid
another slew of lawsuits like those against Manville." However, it does
not necessarily send that message effectively, and it is no substitute for
prevention through a public-health approach.
C. Public Concern About Occupational and
Environmental Health
Public opinion may help create statutes and regulations, but public
opinion alone will not necessarily move employers to act. Nonetheless,
changing public opinion affects workplace health and the climate in
which physicians carry out their work - particularly the prevailing cor-
porate attitudes toward risk, access to medical information, and respon-
sibility for chemical hazards. Information from newspapers and news
broadcasts contributes to public concern about health hazards and indi-
rectly to company medical programS. 40 A major airline physician said:
Airline safety made big news in the 1980s in media coverage
and in Congress, and some speculated that financial difficulties
in the airline industry were compromising maintenance and the
health of pilots and flight attendants was not monitored appro-
priately. Many corporate officers decided reestablishing the
mode of trying to defend themselves, company attorneys and managers fear that by
adopting additional safeguards, they admit that they failed to do things properly in
the past.
40. The media certainly have caused greater public recognition of workplace
hazards and occupational medicine in the past twenty years, through published
articles and news reports on high-profile episodes such as Bhopal, asbestos, and
lead in buildings and the water supply. Media coverage of toxic chemical hazards
has publicized the need for corporate and government responsibility on environ-
mental issues. For example, newspapers and television in the 1980s and 1990s
covered hazards in U.S. Department of Energy facilities and in maquiladoras in
Mexico, children born without brains in Brownsville, Superfund sites around the
country, Chernobyl, and leukemia from groundwater contamination in Woburn,
Massachusetts. These cases have intensified corporate responses to toxics and built
occupational medicine generally. For a discussion of media coverage of workplace
and environmental hazards, see generally PHIL BROWN & EDWIN J. MIDDELSEN,
No SAFE PLACE: Toxic WASTE, LEUKEMIA, AND COMMUNITY ACTION (1990);
STEPHEN ROBERT COUCH & J. STEPHEN KROLL-SMITH, COMMUNITIES AT RISK:
COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS (1991); JONATHAN HARR,
A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
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medical department would be worthwhile so they could better
monitor employees to determine if they were physically fit.
The public's environmental concerns and expectations for safe condi-
tions generally have intensified since the 1970s and interest in environ-
mental issues continues to be strong.4' Concern is generally greater for
environmental hazards than for occupational hazards, and the impact of
the environmental movement has been considerably larger than the im-
pact of the occupational health movement. Environmental laws have
also had more effect on business than workplace health laws. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, is far stronger than
OSHA and its penalties are higher. As a physician in the chemical in-
dustry said:
OSHA is still an extremely weak sister to EPA. Occupational
medicine is a profession in search of a law; we don't have an ef-
fective law.
Environmental hazards such as water and air pollution affect large
numbers of people, thereby creating a broader base for political action
than occupational health can attract. Media coverage is also greater for
environmental health, which is one reason the public and corporate
management are less concerned about workplace health. A major oil
company physician said:
Public opinion has done very little because the public doesn't
care about occupational illness and what goes on in the plant as
long as it doesn't get out of the plant. They care about environ-
mental stuff. It's very difficult to get attention paid to occupa-
tional issues. That's a big problem for the field.
Public opinion nevertheless has helped legitimize the role of occupa-
tional physicians within companies and society. It has helped corporate
management understand more clearly what the issues are - as the pub-
41. The right-to-know campaign that swept the country years ago, leading to the
implementation of the OSHA hazard communication standard and other community
right-to-know laws, also boosted concern with chemical hazards. Greater awareness
coming from media and education leads people to pressure for better medical services.
Increased information has fostered grassroots environmental organizations and facili-
tated labor educational efforts as well. States vary widely in their public-opinion envi-
ronment and rules.
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lic perceives them - and why they need a medical staff, including oc-
cupational physicians. A physician employed by a large computer corpo-
ration said:
The factory used to be that place remote from the community
you didn't have to worry about. Today the public views the fac-
tory as part of the community; they realize that the risks extend
beyond the factory boundaries. That's engendered a big change
in the way the media, courts, and prosecutors look at it. It's sent
a message to executives that they have to be responsible.
Corporate physicians and managers are public citizens and profes-
sionals as well as employees, and as such are affected by public attitudes
about disease risks and the allocation of responsibility to pay for health
damage. A major chemical company physician reported:
There are managers in my chemical company who are absolutely
convinced on a personal level that toxic chemicals cause cancer
in their families. I talk to people at lunch and I'm amazed at it
all the time. They compartmentalize their lives; they can work
for a chemical company, but on a personal level, they are very
fearful of so-called toxic chemicals for their families and they
run around getting tests done all the time and putting detectors
in their homes.
However, it would be easy to overstate corporate concern with environ-
mental hazards by quoting a few executives in companies with known
risks or recent major litigation. A chemical company physician stated:
Executives may read the New York Times, but they are not inter-
ested in health and environmental issues. They are interested in
having people in the corporation handle that for them so they
can run the business. They might take an interest if it's not being
handled well, if it starts to affect their ability to produce and sell
chemicals.
Jury trials are an obvious reflection of public opinion. Juries have
held manufacturers and their insurers liable for health hazards. Employ-
ers have complained that the tort system is out of control and must be
reined in. They therefore have supported tort reform, such as restricting
third-party liability, suits against product manufacturers for effects of
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inherently dangerous products, punitive damages, and other jury awards.
Jurors have become tougher on plaintiffs in part because of the millions
of dollars corporations and their insurers have spent to persuade the
public that a lawsuit crisis exists. They are more likely to give lower and
fewer awards to plaintiffs if they think a lawsuit crisis exists. Tort re-
form contributes to toxic hazards in companies, however, if its success
in reducing jury awards and limiting company liability leads employers
to take fewer preventive measures.
IV. AMBIVALENCE FROM LAWYERS ABOUT
PROVIDING INFORMATION
Due to threats of liability, lawyers sometimes find themselves in con-
flict with doctors over whether to release health information. At other
times - most notably on questions of labeling hazardous substances -
litigation concerns lead lawyers to align themselves with company doc-
tors.
Company lawyers are reluctant to have doctors disclose information
about health hazards that could alarm people or be used against the
company. Physicians in many corporations complain that lawyers do not
want them to say anything about potential hazards, because that would
suggest that the company knew of problems but was not doing enough to
solve them. Overall, increasing sensitivity to potential liability increases
corporate pressure on professionals to restrict employee and public ac-
cess to data. Lawyers, managers, and public relations people pressure
physicians not to provide information that could increase their com-
pany's chances of being held liable for damage to workers or the public.
Company professionals have constraints on publishing and speaking,
conducting studies of suspected exposure hazards, and drawing attention
to problematic working conditions.42 Lawyers set up screening proce-
dures out of concern over how professional staff members may use the
company's name. Company lawyers oppose doing studies or communi-
cating possible health effects to workers and the public because they
might be held responsible for knowing but failing to do enough. They
become particularly concerned when company studies involve notifying
workers, government, or the media. One physician who conducted re-
search and set up a cancer registry for his chemical company said:
42. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 114-37 (1995); SASSOWER, supra note 1, 76-99.
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Companies run the risk of incriminating themselves and gener-
ating lawsuits when they do studies, no question about that. One
time I was concerned when I got word that a lawyer didn't like
the idea of our gathering all these data., He said, "You expose
yourself to problems when you gather data." Lawyers would just
like to burn whatever data you get - whenever you get infor-
mation. Of course I get disturbed by that, but I can understand
their point of view, because someone can just find a rather inno-
cent little piece of paper somewhere that an opposing lawyer
could make look devastating in some way in a trial. That's the
way things go in the courtroom.
A services company physician said:
I was asked to give a talk to a trucking industry group on work-
ers' compensation, and one question afterwards revolved around
wearing fat lifting belts that protect your back. The questioner
said his competitors all used them, and his lawyer said, "Don't
use them because using them admits you have a problem." So I
said, "Do you not give people hard hats in an area where you
need a hard hat because it admits something might fall on your
head? Your lawyer gave you that level of advice." But that's
typical of some lawyers' advice: "Don't do anything. You'll
admit everything if you say anything. So don't say anything to
anybody."
In a major oil company, company doctors and scientists were refused
permission to talk to the public about company health risks. A company
physician said:
We went to management and said "This is why we need to say
the following kinds of things." We would have put on presenta-
tions, but management and company attorneys don't want any-
body in medical or epidemiology to meet with the community
because they're afraid we'll get caught with people asking us
questions and our answer will adversely affect the lawsuit. So
they hired an outside group to come in and do the community
presentation.
Former employees may be constrained from providing information by
company severance packages that bar them from discussing company
matters. In addition, contracts for new employees may include confi-
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dentiality agreements. A muzzle clause in the employment contract that
an executive at a large international corporation was asked to sign stated
that he agreed to "refrain from making any disparaging statements, ei-
ther orally or in writing, about the company, its officers, directors, af-
filiates and officers, directors of any affiliates." Court decisions that
impede access to information are also becoming more prevalent. For
example, litigation awards for health damage may require that court rec-
ords be sealed, and defendant companies often make confidentiality a
condition of settlement.
Lawyers do not always favor limiting access to information. There is
increasing pressure on company officials to speak out and provide in-
formation, thereby potentially protecting the company by making the
public, workers, or other companies assume risk and responsibility.
They therefore sometimes favor publicizing information about serious
risks.
Certain regulations and court decisions, also drive corporations into
more open communication. For example, the assumption-of-risk doc-
trine maintains that if citizens are informed about possible health haz-
ards, they may have assumed the legal risk and corporations may not be
held liable. Sometimes attorneys favor circulating risk information -
even uncertain information that suggests rare possible hazards in the
future - so that people aware of the possibility of harm will have as-
sumed the risk themselves. Lawyers may therefore encourage written
and verbal warnings to customers and citizens' advisory groups in com-
munities where businesses are emitting hazardous chemicals. An attor-
ney. who litigates occupational health cases said, "The lawyers' assump-
tion-of-risk argument is becoming more important than the marketers'
fear of scaring people."
Marketers favor emphasizing the safety of using company products
while withholding risk information from regulators, legislators, and the
public. Similarly, public relations people want risk information to be
understated and remote hazards not to be discussed. A corporate legal
department thus comes into conflict with marketing and public relations
officers about how to describe risks. Although attorneys often clash with
or overrule physicians on questions of health hazards, doctors and com-
pany lawyers often find themselves allied against line managers con-
cerned with sales, as this chemical company physician explained:
The lawyers are our allies in labeling. You make a hazardous
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product legally a non-hazardous product just by labeling and
warning people about it. If I responsibly tell you what this does
and then you kill yourself with it, that's your problem. The law-
yers are very punctilious about labeling, and we find ourselves
clearly on the same wavelength about warning and labeling.
A chemical company physician described the tension between physi-
cians and managers concerned with sales:
The constructive tension between the health guys and the line
guys is over labeling and sales. How you label the stuff and who
you can sell it to are product liability issues. We could profit by
selling you a chemical and then incur several million dollars in
liability after you do something dumb because you don't know
how to deal with it and your house is not equipped for storing it.
The line people want to sell this dangerous stuff. I say, "Wait,
you're selling to a small customer." We make a product that
leaves some messy gunk that's an anti-corrosion material you
can add to well-drilling muds. The problem is, it's probably car-
cinogenic. We can sell it to drillers, but they are cowboys out
there with mud on themselves, all over the equipment - it's a
mess. We said, "We can just burn this stuff under boilers, just
for heat, but we can't sell this stuff as a well-drilling mud edge-
ment, because it's biologically active and carcinogenic." The
line guys concerned with sales say: "Excuse me, but this doesn't
cost us anything. It's pure profit. We'll sell it and label it and go
talk to them a little bit."
A large oil company had a program in which doctors would examine
chest X-rays of all employees in several plants who might have been
exposed to asbestos since the 1940s to look for signs of asbestosis, al-
though no law required them to do this. The company physician de-
scribed the active effort to find the retired employees, to notify them
that their X-rays showed signs of lung damage and that they needed
more frequent medical follow-up and should not smoke. Subsequently
many workers filed a class-action suit in a Texas industrial area against
three or four other companies, but not this one, for failure to inform
workers of their asbestos exposure and adverse health effects. A physi-
cian for the company that warned workers of asbestos risks - partly for
defensive legal reasons - said:
The other companies were successfully sued to the tune of sev-
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eral million dollars, and we were not sued because our employ-
ees had been warned. I don't mean to say we do great things
worldwide, but this story makes a manager sit bolt upright and
say, "You guys are earning your keep. I had no idea what the as-
bestos regulations and our liability were, but you guys ran a pro-
gram, you informed workers, and the three companies across the
street just lost millions of dollars. We didn't." Then the lawyers
started asking, "Well, if this was so great here, are we doing it
elsewhere?" So it caused a systematic assessment of our asbes-
tos-hazard-warning procedures throughout the world. We did a
major mail survey, assessed the results, and then issued new in-
ternal company guidelines to tell medical departments world-
wide what to do with employees who may have been exposed to
asbestos. It became legally driven as much as health-driven at
that point.
Some physicians try to persuade employers to do health monitoring
that statutes or regulations do not require, arguing that litigation over
adverse health effects can be avoided through preventive monitoring. As
an oil company physician explained:
We have successfully persuaded our management to do active
epidemiologically rigorous health surveillance. For instance, we
have an ongoing mortality study - essentially a death registry
of all our U.S. employees who ever worked for us more than a
year. Periodically we do epidemiologic studies of the causes of
death on that data base, looking for jobs or exposures to certain
chemicals that may indicate a problem. We are required to report
anything suspicious to the EPA. That was a sales pitch to man-
agement. It's not something management would ever do on its
own, and we sold that initially about fifteen years ago and need
to resell it aggressively every two or three years. You have to
sell the contribution of the medical department to them in tangi-
ble, bottom-line terms: this data base is useful in supporting our
legal defense and media and community relations and labor-
management issues at the plant level. For instance, someone who
drove a gasoline truck for two years out of his thirty-year career
with the company sues us because gasoline has benzene. Our
lawyers - usually outside counsel - ask us, "What data do you
have about leukemia rates in the company relative to driving gas
trucks?" So we go to the computer and extract leukemia rates of
certain worker subpopulations and it generally helps the lawyers
in their defense.
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A physician in another major oil company who identified cancer cases
in company records used regulatory requirements to overcome manage-
ment's opposition to informing workers and the government of the
findings:
We analyzed our death certificates and found a fairly strong in-
dication that we had an excess risk of leukemia and some related
cancers among our oil and gas field exploration and production
group. Management didn't want to hear that, but then we said,
"You have to tell the employees and the government and we
have to study it further." They particularly didn't want to hear
that we wanted to notify the employees: "Oh, they'll be outraged
and will sue the company and we'll have all these problems. We
can't do that and you haven't proven it yet," so that was a tough
one. We had to point out the law requires us to inform our em-
ployees and the EPA about a possible hazard.
In this case, lawyers collaborated with the physicians, health educators,
corporate communications personnel, and management on wording the
answers the company offered to concerned workers. It was management
rather than the company lawyers that most strongly opposed telling peo-
ple about potential hazards, as the physician explained:
Lawyers pushed for a full, open disclosure of what we had, but
they looked to be sure we weren't saying anything inaccurate or
inflammatory. Management looked at it in their traditional
fashion: "Oh, my God! We don't want anybody to know what's
happening until we're sure, until you've proven that something
is there. We don't want the government to know. They might
come and inspect us. We don't want the workers to know be-
cause then they'll be mad at us."
With the financial stakes in corporate liability cases rising, some cor-
porations have tried to make other corporations responsible for health
hazards. For example, asbestos and textile companies have provided
data on the health risks of smoking in order to increase the liability of
43tobacco companies. As with labeling, company attorneys in these cases
have favored the disclosure of information about corporate health haz-
ards so that other companies would be liable for them.
43. See BRODEUR, supra note 2, at 183.
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Attorneys also have advised employers to inform workers that they
face special medical risks at work but then allow them to choose to re-
main on the job. They have required employees to sign consent forms,
such as those that hospitals use, before undertaking workplace risks.
Although economic decision-making models maintain that people freely
choose risk to advance their own interests and preferences, workers are
restricted in their ability to pursue their own interests." Employees lack
information and job alternatives that would enable them to make choices
that would help protect their health. The assumption of risk requires that
the risk be known and the assumption voluntary.45 However, given the
economic necessity of working, limited job alternatives (especially in
manufacturing industries that experience layoffs and plant shutdowns),
managerial control, and incomplete employee information on hazards,
the available choices are limited.4 6 Another major problem with the eco-
nomic decision-making models in the arena of occupational health is
that company doctors and managers are shielded from the medical,
monetary, and moral consequences of their actions. Managers constantly
take risks that they do not define as risks because the consequences fall
on workers or the public. They correctly perceive that others bear the
risks and costs of their decisions.
V. RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEALTH RISKS AND COSTS
Conceptions of responsibility for health risks have changed in the past
four decades along with trends in personal, professional, public, and
44. For example, according to one leading economist in this field, workers are
paid $900 more on average for hazardous work and therefore deliberately take hazard-
ous work for specific benefits. See W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING
HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 107 (1983).
45. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 68 (5th ed. 1984).
46. See Elena Bianco, Temporary Workers Gaining Market Share, Statistics
Show, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 31, 1996, at A5. See also generally VIRGINIA L. DU
RIVAGE ED., NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORK FORCE
(1992); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE
NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (describing declining employment opportunities for low-
skill workers). For a discussion of medical testing and access to information, see gen-
erally ELAINE DRAPER, RISKY BUSINESS: GENETIC TESTING AND EXCLUSIONARY
PRACTICES IN THE HAZARDOUS WORKPLACE (1991); Maxwell J. Mehlman et al., The
Need for Anonymous Genetic Counseling and Testing, 58 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 393
(1996); American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Use of
Genetic Testing by Employers, 266 JAMA 1827 (1991).
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corporate liability. Employers and the public confront steadily growing
costs of work-related disease, including millions of dollars in medical
care, lost work time, insurance, and disability payments. Spiraling health
costs in the 1980s and 1990s have left employers almost desperately
seeking solutions that would lower their costs and shield them from li-
ability.47 These health costs have been under close scrutiny as part of a
larger debate over health-care delivery. Company doctors and their em-
ployers argue that health costs have badly hurt their companies' eco-
nomic well-being, causing them to lose half the profitability of Ameri-
can industry in the last ten years. Thus employers argue that they must
save on health-care costs either by screening workers better to remove
expensive people from the payrolls or by requiring them to pay a higher
share of the cost. They generally use medical management strategies to
try to control costs rather than increasing spending to create a safe work
environment. Corporations employ physicians to screen workers and
provide health-care to them in the belief that having in-house physicians
is cheaper than just insuring them. Even then, few see the advantages of
using their physicians not only for providing health-care but for helping
create a safe environment through medical surveillance and prevention.
Employers try to characterize the expenses of workplace hazards as a
social cost they need not bear, and they have largely succeeded in doing
so. Individual employees, their families, and the public pay most occu-
pational disease costs in the form of Social Security and Disability (and
they also bear the burden of disease and death, of course).48 Companies
push for more lenient workers' compensation provisions, less restrictive
regulatory penalties, and laws that will hold employers less accountable
for chemical health hazards - all of which would further shift costs
onto workers and the public.
A. The Difficulty of Measuring and Justifying Prevention
Doctors who believe they provide valuable preventive health services
in the corporation bemoan the fact that they have been unable to demon-
strate the cost-saving value of their services to corporate management.
They try to show that preventing lawsuits and reducing workers' com-
pensation claims and absenteeism save the company money. Their best
efforts generally are unconvincing when management asks, "How do
47. See generally ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 11, at 1-368, 466-1077.
48. See id at 129; MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE
EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS (1989).
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you know you did that?" Managers do not see the health benefits and
decreased workers' compensation expenses that in-house doctors claim
to produce. Thus companies cut back their in-house staffs in part be-
cause managers do not believe that a large in-house staff saves the com-
pany money. A telecommunications company physician said:
No officer of this business would disagree that my objective of
healthy, productive people contributing to the success of the
business is a desirable objective. Where we part ways is my pro-
posing that the company spend money in order to save money,
and other people who compete for those resources say, "while
you save money we won't have any money coming in to upgrade
the network." How the corporate leadership prioritizes those
competing demands for limited investment capital in allocating
resources is tricky.
Justifying preventive programs is difficult, in part because the cost
savings of some goals in occupational medicine, such as health educa-
tion, are hard to quantify. The medical community itself is just now be-
ginning to accept preventive medicine and overcome the belief that
curative practices are the only true medicine. As a mining physician
explained:
Nobody bats an eyelash about paying a million dollars to trans-
plant a liver, but it's still hard to get anybody to contribute ten
cents to prevent that liver from being damaged. That concept
still permeates medicine. The controller immediately can put the
value of digging ten tons of coal on the line. You get the same
value through health education, preventive programs, ergonomic
factors, and engineering designs, but it shows up in three to five
years, not immediately.
The telecommunications company physician articulated another aspect
of this difficulty:
Physicians put successful programs in place after companies say
the disease or accident rate is unacceptable. Then a new CEO
with none of this knowledge comes in and says, "We haven't
had any accidents in five years. Why spend so much on this
safety program?" He doesn't know what the rate was without the
prevention program. That's the paradox of prevention: You can't
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count things that don't happen. When you've had a comprehen-
sive program in place for years and a new corporate leadership
team looks at your health-care costs, they don't appreciate what
the situation was before. Their attitude is, "Get rid of these ex-
pensive things and we'll wait and see. We can always put 'em
back in if it goes up, but we've saved a lot of money if it
doesn't."
An important reason doctors have had difficulty in clearly demon-
strating the benefits of their health services is the difficulty of proving a
negative. Preventive programs, by their nature, are difficult to justify
because it is difficult to point to illness prevented and justify a budget
based on prospective savings, to prove that companies get what they pay
for. Physicians in oil and retail sales companies said:
You can crank out numbers but they're not convinced by it, and
in some ways they shouldn't be, because how do you know you
saved money unless you could do a controlled study, which you
could never do. Still, organizations will always get asked, "How
much do you think you return to the company and in what
ways?" So you write a report about what you saved. The budget
for all medical expenses in the company is about eighteen mil-
lion dollars, including all the staff, services we provide, com-
puter support, rents, and supplies. That doesn't even reach a sig-
nificant portion of one percent of our company's expenditures in
a year. The company spent about five billion dollars last year to
explore and produce and refine oil. Our medical department cost
is just a drop in the bucket, but it's an easy figure for them to
look at and say, "Do we want to spend eighteen million dollars?
Can we do it other ways?"
They can't measure the ineffable benefits because they are inef-
fable. How do you measure somebody waking up in the year
2000 on a Tuesday, fifty-four years old, and saying, "Oh my, I
didn't have a heart attack today because in 1970 they persuaded
me in my periodic to quit smoking, get my blood pressure under
control, bring down my cholesterol, stick with a diet, do regular
exercise." There's no measuring that, but the payoff could be
tremendous.
Unfortunately, paying serious attention to occupational disease and
prevention may not make good sense purely on economic grounds. The
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rise in premium costs for workers' compensation is an insufficient deter-
rent to poor control practices in a corporation. Hazards that companies
ignore may never hurt them. The real risk to employers outside of work-
ers' compensation claims may be negligible unless a company is shown
to be willfully negligent. Paying serious attention to occupational dis-
ease does make good sense, however, if a company wants to protect a
skilled work force that is difficult to replace, or desires employee good
will, or has a genuine interest in protecting workers' health.49
Keeping people well adds to pension costs. Healthier workers may
live longer, use more pension benefits, and then develop disease later.
Preventive health measures may thus delay disease so that costs are for
seventy-year-olds instead of sixty-five-year-olds. Telecommunications
and aerospace physicians said:
You can say, "Look, we saved all this money because we pre-
vented so many heart attacks"; but if your company insures peo-
ple from the time they work for you until they die, it doesn't
show on your bottom line today, and maybe you just delayed the
heart attacks and didn't prevent them.
Workers live longer if you improve their health; they'll enjoy
their pension longer at an increased cost to the company, so you
have to be conscious how you present your material in a com-
pany totally oriented towards the dollar; you have to show that
the overall return will be better than something that might be
written off as humanitarian.
However, as this chemical company physician pointed out, cutting pen-
sion costs is not a good reason to avoid preventive health programs:
When I put in a wellness program corporatewide, the argument
of our benefits guy always was, "You'll increase our pension
cost." My counter to that was that I hoped he was right; I hoped
that we would be so successful that people would live longer.
The advantage is that health-care costs are paid out of operating
income. Pensions are vested, so we put aside money for a pen-
sion whether people use it or not. We pay health-care out of our
net profits, so it's a whole lot cheaper to have somebody pen-
sioned longer if you can lower their health-care costs. That's the
49. Company medical programs may have the added benefits of raising pro-
ductivity and morale and reducing use of the company medical plan.
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only way to go.
Top executives typically are judged by their short-term performance,
which militates against investment in disease prevention. Preventive
steps represent a short-term cost and a special burden in times of corpo-
rate retrenchment. Many corporations treat their health and environ-
mental staff as easily expendable, overlooking their potential contribu-
tion for the company's long-term well-being. In contrast, company man-
agements with a long-term perspective believe that spending for preven-
tive services makes good economic and employee-relations sense; they
sustain a level of profitability able to support that longer-term need more
easily, unlike the many American corporations that are struggling with
declining profitability and worldwide market share. 50 American compa-
nies lack long-term vision when they pursue quick profits to satisfy
stockholders and ensure good bonuses for management, a phenomenon
not limited to medical issues. Chemical and conglomerate company phy-
sicians stated:
Management thinks their job is to return money to stockholders,
with an extreme emphasis on short-term profitability, which has
been a pathology of the American economy. Lawyers are there
to let managers do that and reduce liability.
At a meeting the medical benefits people were showing the CEO
on a blackboard ways we could save money. He had two
choices: on the left, save a little bit now through Band-Aid
items, or on the right, go for the big bundle about three years
down the road by implementing the approach that could save us
considerably more. The CEO looked at it and said, "I'll take the
left," which told me that he's being judged by the present. He
probably decided he might not even be around long enough to
see the gigantic savings down the road if he doesn't show profit
now.
In addition to the problem of short-term versus long-term thinking,
focusing the attention of executives on reducing occupational disease
50. See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE
FUTURE: A LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992) (discussing corpo-
rate management's and employees' responses to downsizing); see also William A.
Galston, Won't You Be My Neighbor? 26 AM. PROSPECT 16, 16-21 (1996) (discussing
corporations' declining concern with historic community ties).
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becomes more difficult when the projected savings are small relative to
other company expenses, including health benefits. Physicians with
conglomerate and publishing companies described unsuccessfully
pressing for cost-savings plans in their companies:
We tried to promote a plan to save the company money and we
got an audience with a division president. He paced the floor as
we showed him how we could save two million dollars, and his
response was, "I appreciate your efforts, but this amount is just
too small for me to spend much time and energy on. Right now,
I have twenty-million-dollar issues in savings." Medical depart-
ments don't account for much. You're small compared with
other departments and services are expendable.
Companies are struggling with health-care and paying their
medical bills is probably their biggest fear now. Our company
[of 10,000 people] paid twenty million dollars for health insur-
ance last year. It's just staggering. That's the big issue. We've
shown how we can save them money and provide a great service
to our employees by putting an X-ray machine in here, and we
can save them $275,000 if we put in an in-house pharmacy, but
they haven't done it. They think about too many other big prob-
lems like health insurance and getting a new plant up and run-
ning to put things like that in.
One mining company physician said he saved the company fifty-five
million dollars in benefits by instituting tests showing that people mak-
ing claims either were not ill or had an illness unrelated to their work.
He said:
When I came here, black lung [or coal workers pneumoconiosis]
cost this company sixty million a year in workers' comp bene-
fits. The fund created to pay these benefits was going bankrupt.
When I started reviewing all the cases we were involved with, I
found the black-lung awards were granted with no medical evi-
dence, if you worked in the mines fifteen years. So we did a
study and found that eighty-eight percent of the cases awarded
benefits had normal X-rays, blood-gas studies, and pulmonary-
function studies. Requiring medical input reduced the company
cost to thirty million within eighteen months, and to~five million
in five years. The fund is no longer bankrupt; the people who
deserve compensation get it and others don't. When I saved the
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company fifty-five million dollars, we showed operating man-
agement that the medical function has a bottom-line value they
can see.
But such savings do not necessarily persuade employers that in-house
physicians have continuing value. The employer can still say, "You
served your function; we've brought down costs and instituted new pro-
cedures, but what have you done for us lately?" Large companies often
believe it is cheaper to buy a service than to pay employees, whether
physicians or maintenance workers, especially in view of the benefits
they save. An oil company physician and a physician who directs an
occupational medicine program said:
Companies are not necessarily cutting down on the program, but
they don't seem to care what you spend on contract services as
long as company employees aren't doing the work. Company
employees know the company better and have greater loyalty to
the company than contract workers, and I should be able to per-
form those services better. But this corporation like many others
doesn't care what it costs as long as it doesn't cost people in the
company.
Medical services do not generate income. Although it may cost
as much or slightly more to outplace, it comes out of a different
pocket. They reduce a salary slot. That looks good and indicates
tight management.
The corporate medical department has always been considered a
service unit rather than a line or operational unit that makes money.
However, cost does not entirely explain why corporations outsource
their medical services, because contract services are not necessarily less
expensive than having physicians in-house. Problems of physician loy-
alty to their corporate employers help explain employers' perspective on
replacing in-house physicians with contract physicians.
B. Corporate Loyalty and Costs of Preventing Health Hazards
The corporate model of loyalty and service to the employer is in ten-
sion with the medical profession's model of loyalty to the patient and
advocacy for health. Doctors must constantly cast their medical judg-
ments in profit terms and show the business value of medicine, which
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they sometimes cannot do where services are simply good for the em-
ployees' health. The doctor's opinion and medical priorities will often
prevail in a clinical setting, but implementing an idea or policy within a
corporation requires building consensus among people with diverse per-
spectives and recognizing that health maintenance is only one need of
the corporation. A physician for an oil company said, "In order to find
successful ways of getting your programs to move forward while at the
same time supporting the business objectives, you need to be aware of
the priorities of the large organization that surrounds you." Someone
who puts on a white coat and says, "I'm a doctor. Leave me alone" is
often the person who fails in the business managers' terms. An oil com-
pany physician said:
Occupational physicians must be opportunistic to be able to sur-
vive in the corporate arena. It's a question of being relevant to
what a corporation needs out of doctors. The standard medical
education does not equip doctors to be relevant to corporations,
and old-style doctors sooner or later will be goners if they think
their white coat and stethoscope and reputation and aura of re-
spect alone will be sufficient in the corporate world.
Company doctors describe their corporate work and legal responsi-
bilities in terms of their performance as "team players." Team players
appear to be loyal, in that they follow corporate directives and pursue
their employers' goals. But their preferred view is not solely to serve the
company. Rather, they are team players who bring career and profes-
sional interests to their corporate roles. Being a team player is the new
kind of professionalism. Professionals define it in terms of individual
career, self protection, and survival in corporate employment. When
professionals operate as team players, they usually are not sacrificing for
the good of the society, or even for the good of the corporation. Their
seeming loyalty to the corporation often grows out of fear of losing their
employment or concern for their career opportunities as individuals.
The perspective of the CEO certainly affects the way doctors treat
workers' health. A CEO's sense of noblesse oblige and long-standing
support of employee programs boosts company medicine. Although the
overall corporate culture affects whether the occupational medical pro-
gram is beneficial or not, the medical department may not benefit from a
favorable corporate culture without the CEO's support. It does not mat-
ter who the medical director is, or even if there is one, if senior leader-
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ship is not already persuaded that in-house medicine is good for em-
ployees or the business. A corporate medical director can spend years
building up a program, and then the CEO can change; the whole depart-
ment can be dismantled because the new CEO says, "We're in the busi-
ness of producing oil, not health-care."
One main way in which doctors become team players is by, as they
say, learning to "pick your battles." Doctors sound the theme again and
again that they must do this to avoid becoming isolated in the corpora-
tion. Physicians who have provided medical services to many companies
said:
You have to choose your battles very carefully. You have to say
to management, Okay, I won't go to the mat over these fifty-
fifty things, where it's not real clear. Management could be
right, the worker could be right - who knows? I won't alienate
the legal department or my co-employees over it. I want to go to
the cafeteria and have somebody sit with me.
Being a part of a corporation, making team decisions, a physi-
cian wears velvet handcuffs. You're quiet about it even if you
don't like what's going on.
Physicians face loyalty dilemmas that are invisible to them because
they take the form of pragmatic self-censorship. They do not always try
to persuade managers every time they see something that would be good
for health, because they know it will not succeed. Physicians sometimes
envy the ability to initiate and act on ideas without the many constraints
of being a team player. But they speak of a balance, maturity, and the
need to pick their battles carefully and marshal evidence to go to bat for
a few things. One chemical company physician said:
Picking your battles is part of being a good politician. You can't
fight or win them all, because you're perceived as constantly
tilting at windmills as soon as you try to do that.
Doctors feel threats to their security, even though most could go out
into private practice and survive. A publishing company physician said:
I don't want to go into private practice because it's hard out
there with managed care, and doctors in private practice are
hurting. It's not the time. You always pick your time and your
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place when you want to cause some pointed remarks. There's no
sense rocking the boat at this stage of the game.
Company doctors become more powerful within corporations when
they function as benefits managers and cost-containment experts who
help manage their corporations' enormous health costs, including group-
health insurance and disability. Other company doctors become success-
ful in corporations that perceive a need for them to attend to potentially
costly occupational and environmental health hazards. These corpora-
tions are more likely to hire doctors and provide resources that can make
the physicians more influential. Company doctors also become impor-
tant to corporations through helping employers interpret hazardous sub-
stance regulation and respond to it, where risk management within a
company is a significant issue. Despite these routes to success, powerful
physicians in companies remain atypical.
Some managers take the position that they want to be the first to know
about a problem when it first comes to light; they reward doctors for
informing them and punish physicians for not bringing a matter to man-
agement's attention. Managers tend to take little interest in health issues
unless the law requires them to do so or the related costs appear large.
Even then, management delegates these issues to the lawyers, doctors,
other health professionals, and regulatory staff. They become involved
enough to have only a general understanding that they must comply with
the law.
Physicians who have tried to get management to recognize health
problems and take action to solve them are often punished for bringing
bad news to management when managers assume the stance that know-
ing about hazards creates problems for them. Company doctors seek to
protect themselves by not telling managers what they do.not want to
hear, but feel obligated from time to time to do just that. Management
may consider a message from company doctors especially odious if they
believe it really comes from resented government regulation. An oil
company physician said:
Because often you do things that the government tells corpora-
tions they have to do, you can be tarred with the same brush. It
makes us look like we're just one of those regulators every time
the government passes another law that means you have to com-
ply with something else. We're a necessary evil: "If we had our
choice, we wouldn't have you. But no, the government makes us
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do these things, so I guess we have to have you around."
Another doctor for a major oil company knew about a physician col-
league who was terminated because he brought bad news to the com-
pany executives in the interest of protecting the company. He said that at
the annual meeting, the CEO said, "We don't shoot the messenger." The
physician said, "They do say that in this company they don't shoot the
messenger. Normally they don't."
Some companies have established internal mechanisms - such as
quality circles or ombudspersons - whereby individuals may be free to
express their views. However, corporate professionals recognize that for
their own self-preservation, providing risk information to the govern-
ment, unions, or internal committees is risky because it typically would
be clear by its nature where the information comes from. Thus, it is dif-
ficult for professionals to protest company policies, even where the em-
ployer has procedures for employees to report errors, illegal activity,
and unethical conduct.
Whistleblowers frequently are not disgruntled marginal employees,
but rather people in quality control, health and safety, and other parts of
companies that are supposed to identify problems and act. They blow
the whistle when they find the organization responding inadequately to
problems that they think the employer has a responsibility to solve. 5' But
most corporate professionals do not blow the whistle when they find
major hazards in corporations. They know whistleblowers have suffered
retribution in the past, and that managers have kept them out of the in-
formational loop after concluding that they are not reliable team players
who solve business problems as management defines them. Even some
who have high-level positions in large corporations are not consulted on
important company matters and do not get the ear of the top executives
or gain access to information about the production of new products.
Whether management consults them generally depends on employers'
relationship with their own professionals, and their experience in han-
dling previous problems.
Although corporate professionals generally are not encouraged to
51. See generally Terance D. Miethe & Joyce Rothschild, Whistleblowing and the
Control of Organizational Misconduct, 64 SOC. INQUIRY 322 (1994); Joyce Roth-
schild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblowing as Resistance in Modern Work Organi-
zations: The Politics of Revealing Organizational Deception and Abuse, in
RESISTANCE AND POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS (John Jermier et al. eds., 1994).
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bring costly problems to management's attention, when they do and are
rebuffed, they can make an outside entity - such as their professional
organization or state regulatory agencies - aware of the problem. For
example, if their employer refuses to take remedial measures, company
physicians can report exposure hazards to their professional organiza-
tion, the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medi-
cine (ACOEM), whose ethical code dictates that a physician's loyalty
must be to his or her patients. The organization's professional journal,
The Journal of Occupational Medicine, includes monthly reminders to
company doctors that their responsibility is only to their patients and
that general medical ethics principles of informed consent and confi-
dentiality apply in corporations. Despite these pronouncements and the
fact that the professional organization's members may confidentially
counsel individual physicians, company doctors have had little real help
from professional organizations. ACOEM's ethics board has not im-
posed sanctions on physicians for following their employer's directives,
nor formally censured them for ethics violations, even when serious in-
jury or breaches of confidentiality have been involved.52 Corporate phy-
sicians, like other professional groups, argue that they can best police
themselves. 3
C. Workers' Compensation and Contested Claims
Workers' compensation payments to victims of occupational disease
historically have been low in most companies, shielding employers from
costs as well as lawsuits for disease. But as discussed above, new laws
that widen the scope of employers' compensation payments for chronic
illness, as well as lawsuits against employers who intentionally inflict
52. See American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Ameri-
can College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine Code of Ethical Conduct,
36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 28 (1994), for ACOEM's ethical code. ACOEM's ethics
committee is charged with evaluating possible breaches of professional ethics. While
professionals themselves express conflict over the difficult decisions they make, pro-
fessional journals, speeches, and ethical codes often proclaim the independent profes-
sional judgment of corporate professionals.
53. Millman analyzes a similar pattern with medical mortality review boards, de-
scribing the functioning of these boards as "a cordial affair" that shields fellow profes-
sionals from repercussions for their actions and infrequently sanctions them. See
MARCIA MILLMAN, THE UNKINDEST CUT 97-119 (1977); Marcia Millman, Medical
Mortality Review: A Cordial Affair, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Peter Conrad & Rochelle Kern eds., 1981).
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harm, have undercut employers' traditional immunity to financial re-
sponsibility for occupational disease.54 Also, the minimum requirement
for being considered a compensable injury has recently been lowered
throughout the U.S. The number of conditions that are considered work-
related is expanding, as are the incentives to file claims. Even coronary
artery disease can be considered a compensable job-related injury if an
employee has a heart attack on the job, despite personal risk factors such
as a family history, diabetes, and hypertension. A person with AIDS and
job stress could claim that all the medical care required is compensable
because the job stress accelerated or aggravated the AIDS symptomatol-
ogy.
55
Rising health-care costs have increased the incentives for employers
to reduce disease among employees and to screen workers according to
health risks. Employers also have strong incentives to describe workers'
illnesses as unrelated to work, or to deny disabled workers a medical
impairment rating and force them to continue working even though they
are clearly disabled. A labor health official said:
Doctors don't provide the sort of services workers need because
they aren't trained to understand the work-related claims and
they don't diagnose the illnesses as occupational. The employers
get away scot-free because those illnesses aren't paid out of
54. Workers' compensation began in 1911 to pay for medical care and provide in-
come to people who were hurt at work. Workers' compensation was not designed to
cover disease. Despite recent modifications to widen its coverage, only five percent of
compensation cases are for occupationally induced disease. See John F. Burton, Jr.
The Compensability of Workplace Stress, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR 12
(1988). Some workers are not covered by workers' compensation. For example,
mining safety and injury is under the purview of the Mining Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (MSHA), not OSHA. Longshore workers come under a federally admin-
istered program called the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). Rail-
roads come under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1994 & Supp. 111996), under which injured employees who claim that the company
was negligent in any way may get an attorney and sue for their injuries, which is dif-
ferent from workers' compensation. See id at § 51. A minor injury and surgery that
is successful might wind up with a large settlement. The railroads have decided to set
up a wage continuation program, whereby a person who is legitimately injured and
cannot return to work receives a continuing salary and is paid to be home. Once em-
ployees recover and can go back to work, they come back or are cut off from wage
continuation and can get a lawyer.
55. On. workers' compensation costs, see WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 14, at
715-869.
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workers' compensation. The health-and-welfare funds that pay
for treatment instead can be severely taxed as a result of diseases
not being properly classified.
One important reason why health costs are shifted onto the workers'
compensation system is that many people have no private health insur-
ance. In that situation, both the patient and the provider have an incen-
tive to find a reason why their illnesses are work-related. Providers of
medical services have traditionally sought reimbursement through work-
ers' compensation whenever possible, even when the workplace causa-
tion is questionable. 56 At other times, private providers realize that indi-
viduals do not have complete coverage or their group health plan has
stricter limits than workers' compensation on the number of medical
visits or treatments a person can receive. However, doctors who know
patients will be reimbursed for continuing treatment may continue to
treat them until they reach a limit of visits beyond which the person
must pay out-of-pocket.
Doctors describe the workers' compensation system of payments for
medical expenses as the last sort of unregulated "cash cow" in the medi-
cal field. However, it has come under intense scrutiny and is likely to
change over the next decade, especially if any kind of national health
insurance integrates medical services. For now, though, it is a unique
niche in the economics and practice of medicine, one that has been rela-
tively free of intervention for a long time.
Many employers, insurers, and company doctors maintain that pay-
ments for medical care under workers' compensation are in crisis, rid-
dled with fraud and abuse. 57 They complain that the compensation sys-
tem favors employees over employers and encourages tremendous
waste, especially in the handling of stress claims and "soft tissue" inju-
ries (such as back pain of unclear etiology) that can be treated with
physical therapy. Overall, litigating workers' compensation cases has
been lucrative for attorneys. Individual disease claims generally yield
settlements of only a few thousand dollars, so attorneys need to handle
many such cases to earn a living. Disease claims also tend to be time-
56. The lack of utilization review and limits on coverage helps explain the
escalating workers' compensation medical costs. Workers' compensation pay-
ments for medical expenses have not been slashed like other medical costs and
regulated to the degree that other types of physician services have been.
57. See Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Workers' Compensation:
The Recent California Experience, 52 MD. L. REv. 983, 988 (1993).
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consuming and more difficult than injury claims, unless attorneys can
find many people with the same disease or the same employer. Third-
party tort cases are potentially larger because they generally have no cap
on the size of the awards to plaintiffs. In some jurisdictions, exposed
plaintiffs without symptoms of a disease may nevertheless be able to
collect for their increased risk of developing cancer, based on evidence
from epidemiological or animal studies indicating that the exposure
causes cancer.
5 8
Physicians often advise corporate loss-control personnel about ways
to control workers' compensation costs, serve as witnesses for the com-
pany in contested cases, and heavily influence whether employees are
permitted to return to work after illnesses. They also, along with attor-
neys, absorb money from the compensation system. Although the work-
ers' compensation system was set up to be non-adversarial, it is in fact
highly adversarial and litigious. The two sides have developed sets of
doctors to serve them, so that over time physicians become claimants'
doctors or carriers' doctors, just as there are different sets of lawyers
who represent the different interests. Employers require workers to go to
doctors who consistently support judgments in the companies' favor. A
power company physician explained:
Good-quality physicians don't want to be a part of the workers'
comp system because it is so polluted with fraud. It is a legal
process, not a medical one. I have difficulty finding good clini-
cians to evaluate people for workers' comp, because they don't
like paperwork and the process and how things get polluted.
This is one of my ongoing battles with the claims litigation peo-
ple, too. I treat injured employees and refer them to good clini-
cians who I know will take care of their medical condition. My
good clinicians don't always write the legal reports that man-
agement would like to see, so they want me to change my refer-
ral pattern and send them to their little preferred provider net-
work they'd like us to use for workers' comp injuries. Those are
poor-quality physicians who write magnificent legal reports that
the claims people like to see but don't provide good clinical
care. The vast majority of patients would not file claims and liti-
gate if we took good care of them and treated them better. Pa-
58. See Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993);
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987); Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.1988); GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART
MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS 165-212 (1994).
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tients get totally lost in the system; they're utterly confused by
evaluators and treaters, and who's supposed to be their doctor.
Workers can say they want to change doctors only under certain cir-
cumstances, such as the presence of a state law or a collective bargain-
ing agreement that permits a choice of physician. A labor official with
extensive experience in health issues said:
If companies send you down to Doctor Jones, an independent,
and don't like what he sends back, they shop for another doctor
until they find somebody who gives a prescription they can ac-
cept, even in workers' comp cases. You have a right to see your
own doctor under workers' compensation in some states or if
there's a union, so you might be able to quarrel with them about
what your own physician said and present medical evidence in
an arbitration, but most people don't have that protection.
Health-care reform has already changed the way employers handle
medicine by focusing their attention on the rising cost of providing
medical services to employees. Chief financial officers now worry about
how they will footnote their potential liability in their annual reports. 59
Increased costs and potentially increased liability have become critically
important economic issues to employers and insurance carriers as medi-
cal costs continue to mount as a proportion of the total workers' com-
pensation bill. However, the issue of health-care quality for employees,
whether companies provide it themselves or contract it out, has not
changed substantially. Moreover, the workers' compensation system
draws attention only to the care given to workers after they are hurt
rather than to the need for preventive practices in the workplace.
D. Physicians' Evaluation of Health Risks
in the Context of Disability Law
Discrimination and disability law have had a major effect on work-
place medicine. Examples are the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), 60 the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls bar-
ring fetal exclusion policies in employment,6' and state discrimination
59. Companies need to account for future growth in employers' liability for future
health-care benefits just as they need to account for pension-funding liabilities.
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
61. See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of
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62laws that restrict workplace medical screening. Recent legal decisions
have challenged the ways in which employers and policy advocates
think about screening policies. They also have increased the likelihood
of further costly litigation related to health risks. However, current laws
reinforce the power of managers to define risk and screen out workers,
even as new protections for disabled workers restrict the right of em-
ployers to hire and fire according to health risk. This area of the law is
in great flux, with cities, states, and the federal government actively
contending with medical screening issues and the extent of employee
rights and employer prerogatives.63
The ADA explicitly prohibits pre-employment medical examinations
to detect disabilities (unless the tests offer information about the indi-
vidual's ability to perform job-related functions), and it prohibits dis-
crimination against the disabled by most private employers. 64 Employers
Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
62. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17B: 30-12 (West 1996).
63. See BENJAMIN W. WOLKINSON & RICHARD N. BLOCK, EMPLOYMENT LAW:
THE WORKPLACE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS (1996); Joseph S. Alper,
Does the ADA Provide Protection Against Discrimination on the Basis of Genotype?
23 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 167 (1995). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996), provides limited protection against dis-
criminatory screening by making it illegal for employers to limit, segregate, or classify
employees in any way that would tend to deprive individuals of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect their status as employees through screening pro-
grams that treat differently or disproportionately affect a class protected under Title
VII (such as race, sex, or ethnicity), where employers cannot justify the practice with a
recognized employer defense (such as business necessity or that a policy that explicitly
discriminates against protected classes is based on bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions that are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business). See id;
see also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 132-35 (1984). In
addition, Title VI prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on
race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994 & Supp. 111996).
64. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. I 1996). The employment
provisions of the ADA took effect in 1992. The ADA protects people who have, or
who are perceived to have, physical or mental impairments that substantially limit one
or more of the individual's major life activities from discrimination in employment,
public accommodations, governmental services, transportation, and telecommunica-
tions. See id § 12112(a) (employment), § 12182 (public accommodations), § 12132
(public services in general), § 12102(2) (defining disability). See also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(g) (1998); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,735 (1991) (EEOC guidelines on disabil-
ity). Employers can require physical examinations of applicants only after they make
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must make reasonable accommodation to disabled individuals whose
abilities initially may not seem to match the job requirements, 65 but they
may justifiably refuse to hire them if no reasonable accommodation
would allow them to do the job.66 However, an employer cannot elimi-
nate disabled individuals from work as long as they can perform the
essential functions of their job without endangering themselves or oth-
ers.67 Physicians protest that the ADA compels them not to reject high-
risk individuals. As this computer physician explained:
The ADA essentially says an employer cannot restrict the person
from doing a job unless you can prove there's an imminent dan-
ger to life involved. Courts ask for real proof, not just "I think
it'll happen." At the same time, the corporation has to pay for
injuries a worker may suffer if some negligent act occurs. The
definition of what's disabled is ludicrous. It's everything, with
no limit. You are covered under the ADA if you believe some-
one perceives you to be disabled-maybe someone believes you
have AIDS and you don't have it-how ludicrous can they get?
People who are incapable of working will slip through, and it
will create problems. I don't know how you can be competitive
today with this kind of stuff. To me, it's just like shooting your-
self in the foot and then asking, "How come I'm limping?" It
troubles me that the ADA is so unreasonable: We have to give a
job offer before examining them. What's the sense in that?
The ADA makes it more difficult for companies to screen workers
from activities because of current or future impairments and to use
medical guidelines to reject people from employment. It may not result
in less testing, however. An electronics company physician said:
a conditional offer of employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. I1
1996). However, employers can withdraw an offer if they can prove that an applicant
cannot perform the essential functions of the job even with reasonable accommodation
or if the candidates pose a "direct threat" to themselves or others on the job. See id. §
12111(8) (reasonable accommodation); § 12111(3) (direct threat); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(r) (1998). The ADA explicitly states (in Title V) that prohibited discrimination
does not include conventional risk underwriting by insurance companies or self-
insured employers, instead leaving insurance regulation to the states. See 42 U.S.C. §
12201(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
65. See id. § 12111(8).
66. See id.
67. See id. §§ 12112(a), 12111(3).
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ADA changes the order in which testing and job offers are done,
but if anything, more testing will be done. It is still perfectly
okay to do a medical evaluation after the job offer, so we'll con-
tinue with our evaluations. As soon as people get on board, they
can always claim that you put them into a job that aggravated
their condition. You still have to make sure you have a good
match.
Although employers generally cannot test people or ask medical ques-
tions before offering them employment, they can test for high-risk
workers and use questionnaires after they have extended conditional
employment offers.68 Physicians may determine physical or mental ca-
pabilities to do the job once the employee has accepted it. Employers
have the opportunity to ask about work history and to link it to future
susceptibility, and they can still screen out individuals rather than take
risks with people who have prior health claims or potential health prob-
lems. And an employer can decide whether a reasonable accommodation
to the employee's abilities would enable that person to do the job. A
pharmaceutical company physician said:
We can do a placement examination with no restrictions as long
as we do it after we've made an employment offer. Then we can
do whatever we want and it doesn't have to have a job relation-
ship.
The ADA permits drug testing and does not require employers to ac-
commodate drug-users, 69 but it leaves unclear which other kinds of
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); see also Mark A. Rothstein,
Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
Hous. L. REv. 23, 38 (1992).
69. The ADA excludes persons currently using illegal drugs from the term "indi-
vidual with a disability" as long as the employer took its action against the person du .
to the drug use. See 42 U.S.C. § 12210 (1994 & Supp. 111996). The American Man-
agement Association (AMA) found in 1996 that 81.1 percent of its member companies
in the U.S. conducted drug testing, up from 21.5 percent in 1987. See AMERICAN
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, 1996 AMA SURVEY: WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING AND
DRUG ABUSE POLICIES 1 (1996). The AMA analyzed surveys from about 10 percent
(961) of its 9500 U.S. corporate members, which are relatively large firms that to-
gether employ a quarter of the U.S. work force. See id at 9. Companies reported a
positive test rate in 1995 of four percent among new hires and 1.9 percent among cur-
rent employees. 67.7 percent of the surveyed companies test all new hires for drugs in
pre-employment exams. See id at 3. Large companies generally test all job applicants
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mental or physical disabilities employers can screen for and which dis-
abilities must be accommodated. Case law will clarify how much an
employer must do to accommodate a particular disability.7 0 Courts also
must determine whether or not particular conditions qualify as disabili-
ties. How employers should consider biological and psychological dif-
ferences in employee selection is unclear. Moreover, the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has yet to define what a
medical examination is - which is important because the ADA prohib-
its pre-employment medical examinations. The EEOC has said that
physical agility testing is not a medical examination, so that police and
fire departments can make candidates run obstacle courses; but it has not
ruled on strength testing or a hearing test or an eye chart examination.
What testing and prophylactic restrictions for future harm the ADA
permits remains unsettled. An airline company physician said:
We're asked to discriminate, but we're asked not to discriminate
illegally, so I try for what is fair according to my lights. Unfor-
tunately, I don't always guess what other people will decide later
for every position, who are offered jobs on the condition that they pass the drug test.
They also periodically test workers in safety-sensitive jobs and test people "for cause":
after an accident or functional deficit creates the suspicion that individuals may be
under the influence of drugs. However, employers use tests they acknowledge are not
effective in detecting many problems and result in few positive test results. Corpora-
tions that routinely test job applicants and use for-cause testing typically have a posi-
tive rate of one to four percent. Employers say that although the policing function is
not particularly effective in catching drug users, drug screening nonetheless deters
drug users from applying to work for them and keeps some casual drug-user employ-
ees away from drugs. It helps employers accomplish their non-health-related goals.
See generally NANCY DURBIN & TOM GRANT, FITNESS FOR DUTY IN THE NUCLEAR
INDUSTRY: UPDATE OF THE TECHNICAL ISSUES 1996 (NUREG/CR-6470) (1996);
JACQUES NORMAND ET AL. EDS., UNDER THE INFLUENCE? DRUGS AND THE AMERICAN
WORK FORCE (1994); WOLKINSON & BLOCK, supra note 63; SCoTT MACDONALD &
PAUL ROMAN EDS., DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE (1994).
70. Under the ADA, important issues leave considerable room for judgment, such
as those concerning whether impairments impede the ability to do the job, whether
excluding a person is a business necessity, how much effort is reasonable to put forth
on a job placement, and what reasonable accommodation and work assignments are
for those with potential health problems. In addition to the ADA, other state and fed-
eral laws apply, such as the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) in California.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12993 (1992 & West Supp. 1998). The Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) regulates any company with federal
funding, such as airlines that carry the mail.
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was fair. I've come to loathe being in that position; physicians
are forced to make decisions about prophylactic restrictions,
with no clear guidance available at all. It gets harder and harder,
because when I make a decision, I know I'll be reading it to
some damn judge in court, so I write everything and make every
decision as if I'll have to sit and defend it to judges and lawyers.
I've been practicing thirty years, so I say, "This person has a
good chance within a year or two of needing back surgery," so I
won't let them work. That used to be okay, but now there's some
question about whether I can make prophylactic restrictions at
all that pertain only to the individual's safety. We know if we
restrict people inappropriately they'll bring a grievance and file
an EEOC complaint and then sue us if they exhaust all those op-
tions. Government agencies for discrimination against employ-
ees investigated us a number of times for our decisions about
employees, and we know they come in here loaded for bear.
They assume that you intend to discriminate and they give peo-
ple back pay and reinstate them.
Employers have access to genetic information, from medical records
and from claims for medical reimbursement that employees file. Ac-
cording to the EEOC, the medical examinations employers give after
they make a conditional employment offer may include a genetic test.
But it would be illegal to withdraw an offer after a genetic test if the test
is not job-related. 7' It remains difficult to determine whether the ADA
71. The ADA itself does not even mention genetics or genetic traits, and genetic
susceptibility to disease and death was not a focus of the congressional debate on the
ADA. The EEOC originally took the position that the ADA does not cover individu-
als until they are symptomatic and that the risk of future impairment is not a disability
under the ADA. Then in its March 1995 interpretation of the ADA, the EEOC stated
that disability under the ADA would include individuals who are predisposed to, or
presymptomatic for, a disabling disease. See EEOC, Compliance Manual, Vol. 2,
EEOC Order No. 915.0002, § 902.8 (Mar. 14, 1995). This new section in the EEOC
Compliance Manual concludes that individuals who are subjected to discrimination
based on "genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders" are being
regarded as having disabling impairments. See id However, it is unclear whether
courts will adopt the EEOC opinion. See Mehlmen et al., supra note 46, at 395. Fur-
ther, the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA does not limit an employer's ability to test
or collect medical information after a conditional job offer, even if the information is
not job-related, as long as the same information is requested of all applicants. That
employer right is given by statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
For discussion of the 1995 EEOC interpretation of the ADA regarding genetic dis-
abilities, see Alper, supra note 63, at 167-68; Mehlman et al., supra note 46, at 395.
1999]
586 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:525
covers, as disabled, those persons who might be perceived as having a
genetic disability.712 State discrimination statutes and case law restrict
workplace medical screening and certain uses of medical information,
but few laws that explicitly regulate genetic information have been en-
acted to date.73 Subsequent court cases, Congressional amendments to
the ADA, or legislation such as the Genetic Privacy Act may well
change the circumstances in which medical data can be collected and
circulated legally.
74
For EEOC's former position on asymptomatic individuals under the ADA, see gener-
ally Letter from Phillip B. Calkins, Acting Director of Communication and Legislative
Affairs, EEOC, to Patrick Johnson, Senate of the State of California (June 23, 1993);
Letter from E.M. Thornton, Deputy Legal Counsel, EEOC, to Paul Berg and Sheldon
Wolff, Co-Chairmen of NIH-DOE Joint Subcommittee on the Human Genome (Aug.
2, 1991); Letter from Ronnie Blumenthal, Acting Director of Communications and
Legislative Affairs, EEOC, to Rep. Bob Wise, Chairman, House Subcommittee on
Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture (Nov. 22, 1991).
72. See, e.g., Alper, supra note 63, at 169. In Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196
(1998), a woman with asymptomatic H.I.V. infection was refused care in a dentist's
office. See id at 2198. Ruling in favor of the woman, the Court decided that people
with asymptomatic H.I.V. infection can be covered by the ADA's definition of dis-
ability. See id at 2207. The Court did not rule that the ADA automatically covers
H.I.V. infection, however. (Even before this decision, people with full-blown AIDS
have been considered disabled under the ADA.) This was the Court's first substantive
review of the ADA. The Court's analysis suggested that the ADA would also cover
other asymptomatic conditions that some lower courts have regarded as beyond the
scope of the ADA. See Linda Greenhouse, Ruling on Bias Law: Infected People Can
Be Covered Even with No Symptoms Present, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at Al.
73. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically
Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. &
MED. 109, 141 (1991); see also LoRi B. ANDREWS ET AL. EDS., ASSESSING GENETIC
RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 124 (1994); F. ALLAN
HANSON, TESTING TESTING: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXAMINED LIFE 12
(1993); Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, State Legislative Efforts to Regulate Use
and Potential Misuse of Genetic Information, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 637, 638
(1992).
74. The Genetic Privacy Act, originally formulated by George Annas, is promis-
ing as a comprehensive effort to protect individuals from unauthorized analysis of
their DNA. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND
COMMENTARY (1995). A version of the Genetic Privacy Act has been proposed in the
Maryland Senate, with important genetic privacy provisions. See S. 645, 409 Leg.
(Md., Introduced 1995). It would, among other things: (1) bar unauthorized disclo-
sure of information resulting from genetic analysis; (2) require that authorization for
collection or disclosure of an identifiable DNA sample "may not be coerced"; and (3)
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Through information access rules, insurance company policies, and
employers' hiring and testing policies, medical information can be used
in ways that deepen racial and economic inequality.7 5 Thus in airline,
chemical, and steel companies, blacks and women who have only re-
cently entered relatively high-paying production jobs have been identi-
fied as high-risk. 76 Excluding racial minorities and women from rela-
tively high-paying jobs penalizes economically disadvantaged groups
and deepens divisions in society based on race and ethnicity - and on
gender, as in the case of fetal exclusion policies. 7 Moreover, workers
require that a person to be tested be warned "that access to the results of geneticanaly-
sis by insurance companies, employers, or other third parties may occur" if the person
tested "authorizes their disclosure" and be told that "the disclosure may lead to dis-
crimination" against him or her. See id at §§ 4-504(b), 4-505(a)(2), 4-505(a)(8). For
a discussion of the Genetic Privacy Act and its counterparts, see generally George J.
Annas et al., Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act. Science, Policy, and Practical Con-
siderations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 360 (1995); Neil A. Holtzman, Panel Comment:.
Attempt to Pass the Genetic Privacy Act in Maryland, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 367
(1995); Michael M. J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material:
Stepping Into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109
(1996).
75. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination As a Consequence of Genetic Test-
ing, 50 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 476, 476-77 (1992); Dan W. Brock, The Human Ge-
nome Project and Human Identity, 29 HOUs. L. REV. 7, 8 (1992); Lawrence 0. Gos-
tin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 320 (1995); Philip Reilly, ASHG
Statement on Genetics and Privacy. Testimony to United States Congress, 50 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 640, 640 (1992). See also generally JAMES E. BOWMAN & ROBERT
F. MURRAY, JR., GENETIC VARIATION AND DISORDERS IN PEOPLES OF AFRICAN
ORIGIN (1990); DRAPER, supra note 46; TROY DUSTER, BACK DOOR TO EUGENICS
(1990); DANIEL J. KEVLES & LEROY HOOD EDS., THE CODE OF CODES (1992).
76. See DRAPER, supra note 46 at 65, 71-73, 85-88, 94-96. See generally OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE (1985); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, GENETIC MONITORING AND
SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE (1990) [hereinafter OTA, GENETIC MONITORING].
For discussion of the selective application of fetal exclusion policies, see SUZANNE
UTrARO SAMUELS, FETAL RIGHTS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS: GENDER EQUALITY IN THE
WORKPLACE (1995); Elaine Draper, Fetal Exclusion Policies and Gendered Con-
structions of Suitable Work, 40 SOc. PROBS. 90, 92-103 (1993).
77. The fetal exclusion policies many companies have followed are an important
example of a discriminatory screening approach. These policies, in which women
have been barred from particular jobs because of possible fetal damage, were most
pervasive in companies in the 1980s through the early 1990s, following concern over
reproductive effects, adverse publicity, and lawsuits over fetal damage. In a 1991
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also have little access to the aggregate medical data that may show spe-
cific ethnic groups being disproportionately screened out. This makes it
even more difficult to recognize the social dimensions of screening,
distortions that go beyond issues of medical risks to individuals.
The ADA affects workplace medicine in significant ways. It already
offers employees more protection in companies that formerly did pre-
employment physicals. It also may prove to be a boon for physicians
who serve corporations by determining whether or not individual em-
ployees can perform specific jobs. Physicians help companies comply
with the ADA in job descriptions, in hiring processes, in the matching of
abilities with job requirements, and in deciding what accommodation is
necessary for people with potentially limiting medical conditions. They
have a major role in selecting workers because they make fitness deter-
minations. The prospect of numerous discrimination suits under the
ADA makes doctors and managers more careful about screening out
employees who may not be fit for a particular job because of possible
health risks in the future. That requires greater sophistication and is not
as easily farmed out to a clinic (as employers can do for treating inju-
ries). The ADA may thus strengthen corporate medical programs. A
utility company physician said:
A lot of decisions concerning "Is this person able to do that
job?" are medical. Before the ADA, a corporation could just
have applicants fill out a sheet with 12,000 disabilities:
"Have you had this?" If they had, just tell them, "No, thank you"
and get them out. You can't do that anymore.
case, the Supreme Court ruled that banning all fertile women from particular jobs
because of possible fetal damage is unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Imple-
ment Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
The Johnson Controls Company, which manufactured batteries, had a policy of ex-
cluding fertile women from jobs with exposure to lead, in the belief that lead exposure
to working women may damage fetuses and that the company could be sued for fetal
damage. See id at 191-92. The employer excluded all women except those who
showed proof of surgical sterilization. See id. at 192. Some employers continue their
policies of excluding individuals they consider high risk - even in the face of dis-
crimination suits - because they still fear costly third-party suits on behalf of those
damaged by work exposures. The Johnson Controls decision failed to deal with com-
panies' vulnerability to third-party suits and thereby left many companies that for-
merly had fetal protection policies in a quandary. See United States Supreme Court
Official Transcript at 38, Johnson Controls, Inc. (Case No. 89-1215).
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Although the ADA's requirements for medical assessment increase the
need for occupational medical services, they do not necessarily require
in-house corporate physicians, and may promote off-site corporate
medical screening instead.
In some industries, labor market demands limit the ability of compa-
nies to refuse to hire. For example, the textile industry has not stopped
hiring smokers, even though corporate officials know that smoking am-
plifies the effect of cotton dust and smokers are easy to detect (through
simple observation). A national textile union official stated:
Half the work force in textile industry areas in North and South
Carolina smoke like fiends, yet companies keep hiring them.
They talk about moving to a no-smoking policy in plants, but not
hiring smokers would make them unable to fill their basic staff
needs. These are real labor-market problems. They need every
dependable worker with qualifications who can do the job.
Employers try to manage costs by identifying employees and appli-
cants as potentially expensive or inexpensive. Companies may save
money by putting people on weight-reduction programs and lowering
their blood pressure, but the incentive to screen arises more from the
cost of a few expensive illnesses.18 In view of the huge cost of proce-
dures such as liver or heart transplants, employers increasingly direct
individual employees to lower-cost health-care providers, thus allowing
considerations of cost to prevail over those of quality.
Workers may be considered high risk for health-care costs because of
their spouses or dependents. As this chemical company physician ex-
plained:
The biggest expenses are from spouses and dependents and we
don't examine them. Here I think I'm employing all these Jack
Armstrong wonderful guys, and their teenage kid winds up in a
78. Wellness programs include health screening programs such as for breast can-
cer and hypertension, and health promotion such as smoking cessation and exercise
programs. See Peter Conrad & Diana Chapman Walsh, The New Corporate Health
Ethic: Lifestyle and the Social Control of Work, 22 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 89, 95-
99 (1992); K. R. Pelletier, A Review and Analysis of the Health and Cost-Effective
Outcome Studies of Comprehensive Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Pro-
grams at the Worksite: 1993-1995 Update, 10 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 380, 381-
85 (1996).
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psychiatric hospital for a year and costs us a quarter of a million
dollars.
Companies that self-insure have reason to be particularly interested in
medical information, because they are exempt from state regulation of
how they manage their benefits and treat employees. 79 Even if employ-
ers do not use medical information as a reason to bar high-risk workers
outright, they can use it in other ways that effectively exclude people.
They can modify their insurance coverage to charge prohibitively high
rates, or they can exclude individuals with special risks from medical
coverage, as in McGann v. H & H Music Co.80 In McGann, a small mu-
sic company in Texas decreased the lifetime medical benefit for AIDS-
related claims from $1,000,000 to $5,000 after they became self-insured,
thus denying benefits to McGann, a man with AIDS.8' In finding against
79. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996), exempts self-insured employers from state regula-
tions and laws, such as those regarding minimum required benefits and anti-
discrimination provisions, covering health and retirement plans. Under ERISA, self-
insured employers may eliminate or modify their medical benefits for particular medi-
cal conditions. See id See generally H. Ostrer et al., Insurance and Genetic Testing:
Where Are We Now? 52 AM. J. HUM. GENETiCs 565 (1993); RoSENBLATT ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 159-292, 1001-37. The ERISA rules were originally designed to
protect benefits and pension plans from mismanagement by companies. So Congress
set up regulations for managing certain company pension plans. See ROSENBLATT ET
AL., supra note 11, at 159-60.
80. 964 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., Greenberg v. H & H
Music Company, 506 U.S. 981 (1992).
81. See id at 408. In McGann, a man with AIDS filed suit under § 510 of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994 & Supp. 111996), after he made claims and collected
payments from his employer's commercial insurance plan. See id at 403. The com-
pany became self-insured and then decreased the lifetime medical benefit for AIDS-
related claims from one million to five thousand dollars. See id ERISA provides, in
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, ex-
p el, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary
or exercising any right to which le is entitled under the provisions
of an employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to which such participant may be-
come entitled under the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). The McGann court held that § 510 of
ERISA "does not prohibit an employer from electing not to cover or continue to cover
AIDS, while covering or continuing to cover other catastrophic illnesses, even though
the employer's decision in this respect may stem from some 'prejudice' against AIDS
or its victims generally." McGann, 946 F.2d at 408. The court held that the "alleged
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McGann, the court ruled that self-insured companies can change their
benefit plans post-facto because of an employee's claim or test results,
provide inferior benefits, or charge very high rates to anyone with a
high-risk profile. 2
The ADA has no effect on the post-facto McGann scenario, because
of the ADA's permissive approach to employer practices after the em-
ployment offer. Employers may change their coverage the same day they
receive an employee's claim in the mail. They can argue that they never
offered permanent benefits, and that providing one high-risk employee
with the benefit they initially promised would hurt all the other employ-
ees. Companies that self-insure argue that their responsibility is to make
a profit for their shareholders. 3
Despite the tangle of laws, possible jury trials, and conflicting scien-
tific evidence, employers and physicians continue to differentiate among
workers according to each employee's health risks. They screen for
characteristics that appear to make individuals more likely to develop
diseases that could cost the company more than employee wages. More
testing is available because technologies have improved, but employers
perceive that they cannot easily restrict a person, even if they identify a
special risk, because of government regulations and case law that limit
company testing practices.
Screening employees as a primary control strategy becomes less eco-
nomically attractive to employers if employers must absorb the costs of
screening and employee lawsuits. A corporation's legal liability could
increase, for example, if workers learned that employers knew specific
individuals were susceptible to harm but failed to modify working con-
discrimination is illegal only if it is motivated by a desire to retaliate against an em-
ployee or to deprive an employee of an existing right to which he or she may become
entitled." Id McGann undercuts the traditional function of insurance as spreading
risks and enables companies to avoid high-risk individuals after they identify them.
For discussion of insurance companies' efforts to avoid insuring individuals they con-
sider high-risk, see generally Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and
Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 SCd. 391 (1995); Robert Pear,
Health Insurers Skirting New Law, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at Al.
See also NIH-DOE WORKING GROUP ON ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOE RESEARCH, GENETIC INFORMATION AND HEALTH
INSURANCE, NIH Publication No. 93-3686 (1993).
82. McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
83. Although companies have a responsibility to seek profits for their share-
holders, employers need not make a profit on their employees or on each person
they employ.
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ditions. Thus in order to reduce their need to defend against litigation or
internalize the costs of screening, employers may choose to avoid find-
ing out who is high-risk.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIETY AND SOCIAL POLICY
Alternative policies that could encourage the use of medical informa-
tion in more protective, equitable, and rational ways should have three
main goals: (1) creating organizational incentives for more individual
accountability and social responsibility; (2) separating health services
from employer control; and (3) promoting effective preventive health
measures to reduce long-term corporate and social costs.
A. Legal and Social Policy Protections and
Organizational Incentives
Organizational incentives could encourage professionals and employ-
ees to speak up in organizations, government, and in public forums; and
those who do so should be protected against retribution for engaging in
socially responsible conduct. Managers company-wide should be held
accountable for health and environmental protection. Professional so-
cieties and laws can be used to increase both appropriate loyalty and
individual accountability among company professionals for hazards and
errors. For example, the Corporate Criminal Liability Act of California
provides for significant fines and even the imprisonment of managers
who violate the law, such as those who are found responsible for work-
ers' deaths.8a Extending medical malpractice to corporate professionals
can serve a similar purpose. The threat of lawsuits tends to supplant
strict regulation in many arenas and can be very useful in expanding
individual accountability, getting companies to curtail hazardous condi-
tions, and promoting beneficial social policies.
Physicians generally frame their relations with patients in terms of
personal trust and integrity, downplaying any power problems. After
having been socialized to believe that they have extraordinary power in
society, they are beginning to realize how little power they have when
they are caught between tectonic shifts of the law, insurance companies,
large corporations, powerful medical organizations, and the government
payers that largely control medical services. When workers fear getting
fired, have no employee organization to appeal to, and see doctors use
84. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 387 (West Supp. 1999). See also, supra § II.
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information against them, it matters little how friendly the company
physician is. Good doctor-patient relationships depend on the larger cor-
porate and social structure. In theory, employer demands could actually
make it easier for physicians to function in the corporation, because they
could advise their employers on how to respond to employee pressure.
But rather than pursue that course, most doctors focus on demonstrating
their integrity and trustworthiness to employees while maintaining the
illusion that they must protect employees' health on their own. Physi-
cians find it hard to admit that laws and corporate structures largely
govern their relationship with patients, for that would seem to strip them
of their power - an assault on self-image that few people - especially
doctors - can willingly tolerate. Still, doctors could conceivably seek
workers' empowerment as being in their own professional interest rather
than merely seeking to apply their own power to employees.
Employees could strive to improve their own health by gaining a
greater ability to identify health hazards and influence their working
conditions. Company medical programs could be made responsible to
the work force, as well as to the employer, through joint labor-
management committees like those set up by General Motors and the
United Auto Workers. 85 Union membership is small and declining -
now at its lowest point since the 1930s; only ten percent of the private
sector is unionized, which of course limits possible union influence on
company policies.8 6 Unions also have been constrained by limited in-
formation and lack of power under restrictive labor laws. Moreover,
basic economic issues take precedence over issues of health and em-
ployee participation, especially in periods of layoffs. Nonetheless, or-
85. The U.A.W. and General Motors provided a good model with their UAW-
GM board that meets with scientists acting as adjudicators, information specialists, and
facilitators to try to address workplace concerns jointly. The U.A.W. has been par-
ticularly successful in negotiations with major auto companies over joint training
funds and other issues. OSHA could mandate joint labor-management health com-
mittees and occupational medical services for employees nationwide.
86. In 1997, 9.7 percent of private sector U.S. workers were union members;
10.6 percent of private sector U.S. workers were covered by unions. See BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 444, Table No. 712 (118th ed. 1998).
Union membership for public sector workers is higher: in 1997, 37.2 percent were
union members and 42.3 percent were covered by unions. For wage and salary
workers overall in 1997, 14.1 percent were union members and 15.6 percent were
covered by unions. See id
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ganized labor in heavily unionized industries and workplaces has
pressed for specific services, a prohibition on certain tests, more access
to information, expanded employee representation, and greater inde-
pendence of company doctors. Along with public interest and commu-
nity groups, they have tried to counteract business's flexibility, wealth,
and power in a globalizing economy.8 7 However, gaining influential
transnational resources is overwhelmingly daunting for citizen groups. It
is thus difficult to be optimistic about the prospect of a globalized
counterweight to corporate power and control. Much depends on the
strength and vigilance of community and labor organizations in de-
manding that corporations change their practices.
B. Separating Health Services from Employer Control
The rapid expansion of medical information presents many opportu-
nities for its inappropriate or harmful use by company physicians, em-
ployers, and insurance companies. Individuals should have more rights
over access to test results than current laws provide. People also ought
to be fully informed about risks, the nature of tests, who will get the
results, and what impact they may have. Most employees now have the
right to obtain company medical records if they request them, so they
can find out what tests have been conducted.88 Since misrepresentations
of information can have devastating consequences for employment, in-
surance, and stigmatization, people should be able to learn of inaccura-
cies or unfair uses of their medical records. They need information on
tests and health hazards collected by agencies independent of their em-
ployer, so that they can evaluate their employer's warnings or assur-
ances more effectively. And they need trustworthy information about
risks to individuals as well as aggregate data that may reveal patterns of
health hazards and groups screened out.
87. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 139-54
(1992). See generally BROWN & MIDDELSEN, supra note 40; COUCH & KROLL-
SMITH, supra note 40; Alejandro Portes, Global Villagers: The Rise of Transnational
Communities, 25 AM. PROSPECT 74 (1996) (discussing transnational networks and
communities); Dani Rodrick, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, 107
FOREIGN POL'Y 19 (1997) (discussing the effects of globalization, including its un-
dermining domestic institutions, labor rules, and longstanding social contracts); Mi-
chael Schudson, What If Civic Life Didn't Die? 25 AM. PROSPECT 17 (1996) (dis-
playing an optimistic view of the civic activity of issue-oriented groups).
88. See OSHA Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1020 app. A (1998).
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Physicians' services to employees are likely to improve if control over
them is separated from employment. They could be contracted out to a
third party that both management and employee representatives choose.
Effective regulatory power can serve a critical function in protecting
health, but regulatory oversight of employee health policies has been
limited by cutbacks in enforcement and by a slow and cumbersome pro-
cess of setting standards. Government should strengthen occupational
health standards and provide greater support for training occupational
medicine physicians, thereby encouraging the growth of a professional
base that can advise companies on reducing work hazards. Because most
physicians get little medical school training in occupational health, re-
gional resource centers staffed by board-certified occupational physi-
cians could support them in many ways: by offering health consulting
services, developing surveillance programs, dispensing information
about work hazards, offering physical exams, and evaluating individuals
who might be at special risk. These centers could more credibly study
hazards and protect medicine from the constraints imposed by employ-
ers whose main concern is maximizing company profits. Companies and
the government would jointly pay for the professional services of these
centers; neither of them would employ doctors themselves or retain a
legal right to see any of the center's medical data about employees. Such
a system would allow doctors to address health risks without worrying
that employers could question their allegiance or threaten to fire them; it
could make both research and clinical practice more independent of
management control.
C. Promoting Effective Preventive Health Measures
Prevention must be institutionalized in society as well as in the work-
place through case law and regulations maintaining standards in busi-
ness. Preventing illness is far less costly in human and dollar terms than
acting after the fact. Effectively removing health hazards that employees
perceive could also increase job satisfaction, make the workplace less
stressful, and promote worker health generally. 89 At the very least, rec-
89. For discussion of associations between job satisfaction, control over work, and
health outcomes, see MACDONALD & ROMAN, supra note 69; ROBERT KARASEK &
TORES THEORELL, HEALTHY WORK: STRESS, PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE RECON-
STRUCTION OF WORKING LIFE 83-117 (1990). Low levels of control over work proc-
esses, along with performance demands of jobs that exceed individual and social re-
sources for accomplishing the required tasks, increase job stress and are associated
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ognizing ways in which adverse working conditions contribute to job
dissatisfaction and disease could be a first step toward beneficial alter-
native policies.
Although gaining support for preventive measures is difficult, corpo-
rations should be given incentives to adopt measures that are cost-
effective over the long term as well as incentives to consider long-term
needs of corporations and society in evaluating managerial job perform-
ance, including the need to prevent illness and death. The goal should be
to promote more thorough consideration of the costs of workplace prac-
tices that employees and the public bear. Physicians tend to give little
consideration to these social costs when they tailor their decisions to fit
their allegiances within and outside the corporation.9" Social policy and
the law could help insure that their employers, rather than individual
workers or society as a whole, would bear most of the financial burden
of occupational disease.
By seeking to identify individuals with specific risk factors, company
physicians implicitly argue that all others are safe, so that no further
substance regulation or change in company policies is needed. Work-
place screening should not gain support without careful examination of
the evidence. In addition, to guard against individuals being labeled and
penalized as high-risk, anti-discrimination laws should extend to em-
ployees' pre-existing health conditions.91 The search for high-risk indi-
with higher risk of cardiovascular and other forms of chronic disease.
90. In Moral Mazes, Robert Jackall analyzes what he calls the bureaucratic
ethic of decision making by corporate actors. See generally ROBERT JACKALL,
MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988). What he calls a
problem of bureaucracy, though, is really insufficient bureaucracy and quasi-feudal
loyalty to employers. Corporate actors generally view their work not through a
fixed bureaucratic lens of rules and procedures as much as through a changing web
of allegiances within and outside the corporation.
91. Although, according to EEOC guidelines, the ADA now covers individuals
perceived to be susceptible to illness and not just those who are symptomatic, case law
has yet to determine whether and under what circumstances an employer must ac-
commodate someone who may be at special risk in the workplace. Government
regulations could follow the lead of the OSHA lead standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025
(1998), which provides that if individuals are at special risk, they could be transferred
temporarily to other jobs but retain their wages and seniority. See id. Companies
could offer individuals at risk an opportunity to move to an equal-status job in another
area without any loss of pay, but companies that are small or in a downsizing mode
would have difficulty doing this. For discussion of state laws that bar genetic dis-
crimination and proposed federal legislation, see Gostin, supra note 73, at 141-42;
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viduals should not limit the use of effective strategies for reducing envi-
ronmental hazards and disease that are already widely recognized but
underfunded. 92 Investing in improved management policies and working
conditions could deter disease more effectively than broad employee
testing.
If risk is conceptualized in terms of workplace hazards that all ex-
posed workers confront, then employers should tighten engineering
controls, monitor exposure hazards, replace hazardous products, and
collect scientific information on risks to populations; only such efforts
can reveal whether working conditions are indeed safe. Finally, national
health coverage and a single-payer health-care system of government-
financed services could mean that individuals and groups considered
high-risk would no longer be denied health coverage or affordable
medical care. Screening under such a system would have fewer adverse
effects on those considered high-risk, for they would have less to fear
about losing access to medical treatment.
93
CONCLUSION
Current conflicts over whether individual workers, corporations, or
society as a whole should bear the work-related costs of chemical expo-
sure risks and medical care are likely to expand over the next decade.
The initiation of new health and employment policies that could curtail
health hazards and the detrimental uses of medical information will
likely involve legal challenges, government regulation, education, and
collective bargaining. Problems of health hazards, privacy, and dis-
crimination will not be solved without adequately addressing the power
McEwen & Reilly, supra note 73, at 638-43; Karen H. Rothenberg, Genetic Informa-
tion and Health Insurance: State Legislative Approaches, 23 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
312, 313 (1995); Pear, supra note 81, at Al; Robert Pear, States Pass Laws to Regu-
late Use of Genetic Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1997, at Al; Jennifer Preston, Bill in
New Jersey Would Limit Use of Genetic Tests by Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996,
at A 1. See also ANNAS ETr AL., GENETIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 74.
92. See, e.g., Pelletier, supra note 78, at 386-87; John H. Cushman, Jr., US. Re-
shaping Cancer Strategy As Incidence in Children Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1997,
at Al.
93. Despite political obstacles to enacting a national single-payer health-care sys-
tem, political leaders could overcome opposition to reform by educating the public
about the expense, the gaps in coverage, and the inequities of the current health-care
delivery system. For discussion of insurance companies' efforts to avoid insuring
individuals they consider high risk, see Pear, supra note 81, at Al.
1999]
598 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:525
dynamics, laws, and economic interests that affect the work of corporate
professionals.
Most theoretical and empirical studies approach professionalization
and corporatization as if they were two very different and conflicting
processes. But in fact, the professionalization process has oriented pro-
fessionals to work in organizations, often large bureaucratic organiza-
tions. Professionals no longer identify only with their professional refer-
ence group; they also identify strongly with, or acquiesce to, the pursuit
of corporate goals. Corporate pressures on physicians have intensified
over the past four decades, as lawsuits, publicity about chemical risks,
government regulation, and higher insurance and workers' compensation
expenses have raised employers' costs. Professionalization and corpo-
ratization are intensifying simultaneously, and in many ways reinforce
each other: corporate professionals are becoming more professionalized
even as they cede greater control to their employers.
As we have seen, the perceived threat of legal liability is double-
edged. It diverts resources away from hazard prevention and into defen-
sive actions against perceived litigation risks, such as hiding information
about hazards. It leads corporate professionals to respond to it through
preventive law rather than preventive health. But the perceived threat of
liability also provides incentives for managers to invest in engineering
controls and safer practices, to warn workers of health risks pro-
actively, and to strengthen physicians' leverage with management when
they advocate more health-protective measures.
The legal environment defines company physicians sometimes as
principally corporate employees but at other times as autonomous pro-
fessionals. Company physicians now know they can be sued individu-
ally, held personally responsible for their actions, and even face criminal
charges against them as individuals. 94 This perceived threat reinforces
professional standards and bolsters independent professional judgment
in corporations.
The dilemmas that corporate physicians face concerning liability and
94. On liability related to occupational health, see BUSINESS LAWS, INC.,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW (1994); WOLKINSON & BLOCK, supra
note 63; Bixby, supra note 18. See also General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876
P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (upholding a cause of action for wrongful discharge by an in-
house corporate lawyer who claimed that the employer made illegitimate demands
that conflicted with the mandatory ethical norms in the California Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct).
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the treatment of workers are in part ethical problems. The conflicting
organizational demands from being both a corporate employee and an
autonomous professional constitute a social and structural problem
rather than a problem of individual ethics. Professionals can be well-
intentioned and conscientious, but if companies employ them, they usu-
ally end up conforming to the corporate culture and advancing the cor-
poration's ends - or not keeping their job unless they can convince the
management to alter its practices. Doctors become involved in such ac-
tivities as determining fitness for work and reducing employer liability
not because they have "bad values," but because they are doing the job
they were hired to do. Thus, the legal and social context of the work-
place and the position of individuals within the organization's power
structure largely determine that company professionals will be pro-
management. Bringing about effective policies therefore requires in-
creasing the power of corporate professionals and employees to protect
the long-term interests of the company, its employees, and society.
APPENDIX ON STUDY DATA AND METHODS
The principal data and methods used in this research are 100 in-depth
interviews and other fieldwork, documents, cases, and an analysis of
historical and statistical materials.
I. INTERVIEWS
A. Interview Informants
This study involved conducting semi-structured, in-person interviews
with 100 people across the country, many of whom are key informants
concerned with occupational medicine. The 100 informants are from
four groups: (1) 60 company physicians and medical directors in com-
panies with in-house medical staffs; and (2) 40 individuals with par-
ticular expertise in corporate medicine, drawn from three groups: (A)
government officials concerned with occupational medicine or charged
with employment and health policy making; (B) labor officials knowl-
edgeable about employee health risks and worker selection; (C) univer-
sity clinic physicians and scientists, representatives from medical and
trade associations, attorneys, and others outside government agencies
and corporations who specialize in occupational health. Scientists who
provide medical research or screening services to employers are of par-
ticular interest, as are physicians who direct occupational medical resi-
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dency programs and attorneys involved in litigation over medical
screening.
In complex and controversial areas such as this, relying on survey
research as the major source of data certainly seemed out of the question
because it would have missed important information. Those to be ques-
tioned should be allowed to describe their employment practices in de-
tail without being limited to multiple-choice or otherwise brief, easily
quantified responses. They also should be able to discuss their experi-
ences and perspectives in ways that go beyond what they might say in a
public forum. Thus, this study committed me to the labor-intensive en-
terprise of interviewing a broad range of people in person with flexible
interview guides, studying documents, and observing people functioning
in their daily work in order to capture the complex reality of their social
world.95 This approach allowed me to assess the significance and mean-
ing that social actors give to corporate professional work and the rela-
tionship between their perceptions and the actual workplace practices.
Large manufacturing corporations that confront significant medical
hazards in their line of work typically retain occupational physicians on
staff. Corporate informants were primarily from large firms in the
chemical, oil, automobile, metals and mining, pharmaceutical, airline,
telecommunications, aerospace, transportation, utilities, computers, and
electronics industries. 96 These companies generally have substantial
medical programs, more sophisticated technologies, and extensive expe-
rience with health hazards. They also are heavily involved in the medi-
cal selection of workers. The issues of health effects from hazardous
chemicals and the identification of high-risk groups have also been most
salient there. Further, the toxic exposure problems in these industries are
in many cases "upstream" and therefore magnified versions of exposure
in the industries they supply. In addition, physicians in smaller firms and
other types of corporations and government organizations using medical
information also were investigated to some extent for comparison. As
95. For discussion of intensive interview data and analysis, and the constructed
social world they can illuminate, see generally JOHN LOFLAND & LYN H. LOFLAND,
ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS (2d ed. 1984); ELLIOT G. MISHLER, RESEARCH
INTERVIEWING: CONTEXT AND NARRATIVE (1986); ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET
CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES
AND TECHNIQUES (1990).
96. Physicians were also selected from other industries, including textiles,
banking, publishing and broadcasting, consumer products, conglomerates, retail
sales, financial services, and other manufacturing and service corporations.
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explained earlier, the principal theoretical interest and research focus of
this study is large non-medical corporations that employ medical profes-
sionals, not corporations such as hospitals that revolve around physi-
cians' professional activities.
Physicians who are corporate medical directors offered a special per-
spective stemming from their management of other company physicians,
their relationship with other high-level corporate managers, and their
typical heightened visibility attained through participating in medical
associations and testifying at government hearings.
I interviewed former in-house physicians who now do consulting for
companies as well as in-house physicians who had worked as consult-
ants or contractors in occupational medicine. I also talked with physi-
cians with experience in the military and HMOs for comparison to gain
insight into their work structures and processes.
The interview informants who were not company doctors were
knowledgeable about occupational medicine practiced in corporations.
They were well acquainted with the work of corporate physicians,
though from vantage points different from that of the company doctor.
The individuals to be interviewed were selected from a national
population, to allow for regional variation and for interviewing federal
officials and major informants located in many other states.97 Approxi-
mately half of the company physicians and other informants were from
the Eastern half of the country and approximately half were from the
Western half of the country, with the South and Midwest represented
along with the East and West coasts. Informants were selected so as to
achieve a broad regional and industrial distribution across the country,
which the research design required for analyzing the data. The age range
of physician informants both inside and outside corporations also was
wide, reflecting the populations they represent. I interviewed people
97. Medical and trade association data on company physicians (such as from
ACOEM) provided overall information and facilitated the selection of physicians to
be interviewed. The selection method for this study yielded a more informative,
broad, and truly representative group of informants than could have been obtained
by drawing a random sample from existing data sources. No national sampling
frame adequate for this study existed for drawing a random sample of informants.
For example, medical associations do have data on their physician members, but
these data omit too many of the types of physicians in large companies that are the
focus of this study. Further, medical association data do not offer us information
on the variables (such as regarding training and circumstances of corporate em-
ployment) that the study uses and that informed the selection of informants.
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fresh out of residency programs along with physicians who have prac-
ticed in corporate medicine for at least ten to twenty years and people
close to retirement. The sexual and racial composition of physician re-
spondents is heavily white males, reflecting the population of occupa-
tional physicians that corporations employ.98 Overall, I chose informants
so as to ensure breadth in type of organization, company position, and
perspective. I chose non-physician informants in such a way as to attain
diversity within the categories of informants, including variation by re-
gion and organization represented.
I interviewed people in a broad range of industries. Approximately
two-thirds of the physician respondents and non-physician corporate
personnel were selected from Fortune 500 companies in chemical, oil,
metals and mining, automobile, pharmaceutical, aerospace, telecommu-
nications, airline, transportation, utilities, computers, and electronics
industries. In addition, approximately two-thirds of the labor officials
were from these industries. The remaining third of the physician and
labor individuals were from smaller companies in those industries and
from other employing organizations.
Typically, one physician was selected from each company, but more
than one physician occasionally was selected from a company, espe-
cially if the physicians were from different geographical regions of the
country in a large company and were widely separated by length of em-
ployment in the firm and in occupational medicine.
Individuals to be interviewed were identified through the professional
literature and through methods of key informant referral used to achieve
the demographic, industry, and regional distribution that the study sam-
ple and research design defined. Names of most individuals to be inter-
viewed were obtained from publications and documents such as articles,
legislative hearings, professional publications, and conference proceed-
ings.99
Names of corporate medical directors were readily available through
medical and trade association publications. Other physicians generally
provided names of some specific physicians in the firms selected for
study. Referring physicians were from professional societies, corporate
98. Seven of the 60 company physicians (approximately 12 percent) are
women.
99. While names of most individuals interviewed were obtained from docu-
mentary sources, other names were obtained from contacts familiar with the arena
of occupational medicine.
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medical departments, and occupational medical clinics. I initially con-
tacted the individuals interviewed directly by phone or letter.
The majority of the corporate, labor, academic, legal, and government
personnel selected for interviewing were leaders rather than lower-
ranking members of their organizations. These informants were promi-
nent in their own fields and known for their expertise in occupational
medicine. For example, those interviewed include the directors of occu-
pational health agencies and programs, labor officials responsible for
health and safety in international unions, directors of university occupa-
tional medical clinics, legal scholars specializing in corporate medical
liability and workplace health issues, the president of a national occupa-
tional medical association, and the environmental affairs director of a
major chemical company. The research design decision to interview
more leaders than lower-ranking members of organizations reflected a
desire to find particularly well-informed respondents-individuals who
were not only highly knowledgeable about occupational medicine and
the conditions affecting it but also were aware of the range of perspec-
tives on it in their own and other organizations.
The comparative design of this research ensured that interview infor-
mants were acquainted with the concerns of this study from a range of
important vantage points. For example, they offered varying perspec-
tives on medical information as it is used in large corporations.
The research design identified individuals to be interviewed because
of their structural location in specific positions and organizations. Indi-
viduals to be interviewed were chosen to be generally typical of those in
the same types of positions and organizations. The reasons for choosing
these informants stemmed from previous empirical research and from
their structural location in specific key positions. I chose individuals to
be interviewed for sound methodological and sociological reasons, not
because individuals fell into arbitrary categories that seemed plausible
or because they offered to be interviewed due to their strong views about
occupational medicine.
B. Interview Questioning
Initial and follow-up interviews were conducted between 1988 and
1998, most of them after 1991. Interviews generally lasted from one to
three hours and some of them extended over more than one session.
They were conducted in an office, home, or another location, as the in-
terviewee preferred.
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Confidentiality of informants' identity was maintained, in that their
names were not used in the analysis and presentation of the findings,
except for those individuals who wished not to be interviewed anony-
mously and formally allowed their names to be revealed. The position or
affiliation of individuals who are quoted by name or cited anonymously
is generally the one they held at the time of the statement.
Significant problems of access to corporate officials and professionals
did not occur in this study. Previous research had led to a familiarity
with the field settings and network of physicians, corporate officials,
and other contacts who facilitated access to a broad range of informants.
As in earlier research projects using interviews, the individuals inter-
viewed for this study were generally cooperative and willing to talk at
length. Prior interviews with occupational physicians-along with cor-
porate, government, and labor officials-indicated that they generally
speak knowledgeably, often eloquently, about the changing conditions
affecting their work, as well as their own views and decisions.
The interviews were focused and semi-structured. To prepare for the
interviews, I examined documents and publications for relevant data and
leads. I developed and revised interview guides with detailed questions
after exploratory discussions with informants. I questioned the individu-
als in areas such as: (1) their background and experience in occupational
medicine and corporate employment; (2) their knowledge of the ways in
which medical information has been applied and employees with health
risks have been identified; (3) their views of the broader arena of health
and employment practices, as a context for corporate medical profes-
sional work; (4) cases of workplace medical screening; and (5) legal
dimensions of health risks and workplace practices. Individuals de-
scribed their general perspective and their own experience. Actual cases
that physicians discussed yielded more valuable data on decision-
making than a discussion of hypothetical cases and imagined conse-
quences would have. I analyzed major cases of corporate medical prac-
tices that emerged from the research.
Non-physician informants were questioned regarding the same arenas
of decision-making, social consequences, and underlying structural fac-
tors as the physician respondents, but from the perspective of the indi-
vidual's own area of expertise. In addition to the questions similar to
those asked of physicians, union officials were asked about union pres-
sures on medical professionals and the experience of the union with
company physicians, medical association personnel were asked about
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professional influences on company physicians and the experience of the
association with company physicians, and non-physician corporate per-
sonnel were asked about corporate influences on company physicians
and their experience with company physicians.
Interviews with directors of occupational medicine residency training
programs around the country provided insight into the skills, training,
and goals of physicians who join corporations. They also illuminated the
perspective of doctors who joined consulting companies, government,
and universities. In addition to the program directors, I interviewed
many doctors who teach or otherwise contribute to the residency pro-
grams.
Interview transcripts provided crucial detail and wording accuracy
that was important to this research. The data could be analyzed repeat-
edly to discover the existence of otherwise unnoticed phenomena and
verify the existence of suggested patterns. Thus, analysis did not depend
entirely on what researchers thought was interesting or significant be-
fore analyzing the data. Transcripts also facilitated carrying out detailed
analysis of the interviews.
100
In addition to the 100 interviews, I observed and talked informally
with many people at conferences and hearings on occupational risk, at
meetings of the doctors' professional organizations, and at a wide range
of workplaces. This field research was a valuable supplement to the data
obtained in interviews, surveys, and documents. It offered insight into
the people being studied and provided telling details from their daily
work environment and interaction with others at meetings.
This study drew from existing survey data on company policies,
medical screening, and risk perspectives.' 0 1 National opinion polls and
surveys from medical and trade associations offered valuable data.
Medical associations collect data from their members, just as trade asso-
ciations collect extensive data from their member company officials and
corporations. For example, the American College of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine conducts surveys on member physicians, occu-
pational medicine, and screening programs related to this study. Much
of this information is summarized in the Journal of Occupational Medi-
100. Most interviews were taped and transcribed.
101. See, e.g., OTA, GENETIC MONITORING, supra note 76; CYNTHIA DANIELS
ET AL., FAMILY, WORK, AND HEALTH (1988); Billings et al., supra note 75 (1992);
Frances M. Lynn, The Interplay of Science and Values in Assessing and Regulating
Environmental Risks, I I SCI. TECH. HUM. VALUES 40 (1986).
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cine and other publications; and detailed survey data often are available
beyond those that are published. I asked officials from medical and trade
associations, government agencies, public interest organizations, and
labor unions for survey data of members and of other groups. Legal
analysts, medical researchers, and academic scholars have additional
survey data relevant to this study. The literature review, document col-
lection, and interviews unearthed new survey data sources and facili-
tated access to them.
II. DOCUMENTARY, STATISTICAL, AND HISTORICAL
RESEARCH
In addition to the interviews, I drew on numerous other sources of
data on company physicians, including government documents, confer-
ence proceedings, hearing transcripts, employment records and health
data, scientific publications, and unpublished documents. I also re-
viewed historical and sociological materials regarding the history of
corporations, medicine, and professions; occupational health practices;
employment trends; literature on specific professions such as lawyers
and engineers; and legal cases, regulations, statutes, and proposed bills.
Documents provided valuable evidence regarding occupational medi-
cine and corporate professional work. Substantial data on the empirical
and theoretical concerns of this study appeared in documents such as
unpublished reports and position papers, corporate newsletters, formal
employment policies, submitted legal testimony, policy statements, trade
association reports, internal memoranda, and press releases. Informants
wrote or were quoted in many of these data sources. Some of these
documents were readily available to the public. I obtained other docu-
ments through people I interviewed, medical and trade association rep-
resentatives, government officials, attorneys, corporate employees, and
other resources. Previous research experience and familiarity with many
organizational representatives facilitated access to these documents. As
with the interview component of the research, emphasis in the docu-
mentary, statistical, and historical research was on large corporations as
employing organizations.
III. INTEGRATION OF DATA SOURCES
A major advantage of the research design was that it generated a large
volume of comparative data from several types of people. The diverse
data sources also allowed me to collect crucial contextual information
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pertaining to each interview. This included data on the litigation and
regulatory history of the company, the economic conditions affecting it,
the location of company medicine in the changing corporate structure,
and the work and publications background of the person interviewed. I
examined these data sources discussing a particular organization and
informant before carrying out the interview, thereby enabling the ques-
tioning to be more specific and informed. Linking these other types of
information with interview data also provided a deeper understanding of
the legal, professional, corporate, and public pressures on decision-
making than could be obtained from the interviews alone.
The field research methods of data collection and analysis were those
the researcher has developed in several previous research projects and
fine-tuned in advanced graduate field research methods courses I have
taught. I conducted the interviews, took primary responsibility for ana-
lyzing them, and developed theoretical conceptualizations and analyses
of the study data. Research assistants carried out specific delimited tasks
of data collection and organization.
The systematic field research methods used in this research offered an
understanding of the social context of corporate professional work that
abstract investigations, literature reviews, or social surveys alone could
not adequately provide. In-depth personal interviews combined with
documents and field observation provided crucial missing information
and enabled us to analyze corporate professional work from a range of
perspectives.
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